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Note
NODAK BANCORPORATION v. CI:AKE REDEFINING THE RIGHTS
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN A FREEZE-OUT
MERGER UNDER THE NATIONAL BANK ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 215a(a) of the National Bank Act authorizes national and
state banks to merge, upon the affirmative vote of the majority sharehold-
ers of each participating bank and with the approval of the Comptroller of
Currency, into national banking associations.1 Section 215a(b) entitles
1. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) (1988). Section 215a of the National Bank Act, enti-
tled "[m]ergers of national banks or State banks into national banks," provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Approval of Comptroller, board and shareholders; merger agree-
ment; notice; capital stock; liability of receiving association
One or more national banking associations or one or more State
banks, with the approval of the Comptroller, under an agreement not
inconsistent with this subchapter, may merge into a national banking as-
sociation located within the same State, under the charter of the receiv-
ing association. The merger agreement shall-
(1) be agreed upon in writing by a majority of the board of
directors of each association or State bank participating in the plan
of merger;
(2) be ratified and confirmed by the affirmative vote of the
shareholders of each such association or State bank owning at least
two-thirds of its capital stock outstanding, or by a greater proportion
of such capital stock in the case of a State bank if the laws of the State
where it is organized so require, at a meeting to be held on the call
of the directors, after publishing notice of the time, place, and object
of the meeting for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation published in the place where the association or State
bank is located, or, if there is no such newspaper, then in the news-
paper of general circulation published nearest thereto, and after
sending such notice to each shareholder of record by certified or
registered mail at least ten days prior to the meeting, except to those
shareholders who specifically waive notice, but any additional notice
shall be given to the shareholders of such State bank which may be
required by the laws of the State where it is organized. Publication of
notice may be waived, in cases where the Comptroller determines
that an emergency exists justifying such waiver, by unanimous action
of the shareholders of the association or State banks;
(3) specify the amount of the capital stock of the receiving as-
sociation, which shall not be less than that required under existing
law for the organization of a national bank in the place in which it is
located and which will be outstanding upon completion of the
merger, the amount of stock (if any) to be allocated, and cash (if
any) to be paid, to the shareholders of the association or State bank
being merged into the receiving association; and
(915)
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dissenting shareholders to the cash value of their shares in the merged
corporation.2 Sections 215a(c) and (d) provide detailed methods for the
(4) provide that the receiving association shall be liable for all
liabilities of the association or State bank being merged into the re-
ceiving association.
Id. For a further discussion of the merger provisions of the National Bank Act, see
generally 2 MIHAEL P. MALLOY, THE COR'OATE LAw OF BANs § 9.2.3 (1988); 7
MICHIE ON BANis AND BANKING, Ch. 15, §§ 229-30 (repl. vol. 1989);James T. Pitts &
JJ. Cranmore, Considerations Under the Federal Banking and Securities Law with Respect
to Bank Mergers or Takeovers, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 789, 811-13 (1983); Robert L.
Tortoriello, Structuring a Friendly Bank Acquisition: Corporate, Securities, Antitrust, Tax
and Accounting Considerations, in BANK AcQulsnroNs AND T~AKovEas 1989 77-81
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Ser. No. 647, 1989).
A national bank is defined as a "corporate entit[y] charged with duties to the
public, and [is] more than a mere private corporation for profit." MICHIE, supra,
Ch. 15, § 1, at 2. National banks are privately owned, but are instrumentalities of
the federal government and operate as fiscal agents for the federal government.
Id. at 3. Congress created national banks for the public purposes of providing a
uniform and national currency, establishing a market for general government
loans and promoting other fiscal policies of the United States. Id. at 3-4.
The United States banking industry operates as a dual system, consisting of
national banks, which are chartered and examined by the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, and state banks, which are chartered and regulated by state
agencies. Pitts & Cranmore, supra, at 789. The National Bank Act of 1864, Act of
June 5, 1864, Ch. CVI, 13 Stat. 99 (1864), created the national banking system, in
order to "foste[r] a policy of competitive equality between national and state
chartered banks." Pitts & Cranmore, supra, at 789-90. National banks operate pur-
suant to state laws except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with federal
laws under the National Bank Act. Id. at 790.
A bank consolidation is "a transaction in which two or more preexisting
[bank] institutions join together and create a new [bank] institution." Id. at 811 &
n.137. A bank merger is "a transaction in which one of the pre-existing [bank]
institutions survives with the other(s) disappearing into it." Id.
The statutory provisions for mergers and consolidations involving national
banks are dependent on whether the transaction involves a merger or consolida-
tion and whether the resulting bank is a national or state bank. Id. Section 214a
governs mergers and consolidations in which a state bank is the surviving bank
institution. 12 U.S.C. § 214a (1988). Section 215 governs consolidations in which
a national bank is the newly created entity. 12 U.S.C. § 215 (1988). Section 215a
governs mergers in which a national bank is the surviving entity. 12 U.S.C. § 215a
(1988). NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993), involved
the merger of two national banks, and therefore § 215a is the applicable provision
analyzed in this Note.
2. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(b) (1988). Section 215a(b) of the National Bank Act pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(b) Dissenting shareholders
If a merger shall be voted for at the called meetings by the necessary
majorities of the shareholders of each association or State bank partici-
pating in the plan of merger, and thereafter the merger shall be ap-
roved by the Comptroller, any shareholder of any association or State
ank to be merged into the receiving association who has voted against
such merger at the meeting of the association or bank of which he is a
stockholder, or has given notice in writing at or prior to such meeting to
the presiding officer that he dissents from the plan of merger, shall be
entitled to receive the value of the share so held by him when such
merger shall be approved by the Comptroller upon written request made
2
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appraisal and sale of the dissenting shareholders' interests.3
Recently, federal courts have begun to address the issue of whether,
through the use of a freeze-out merger technique, a national or state
bank's majority shareholders may require the minority shareholders to
take cash for the value of their shares instead of shares in the newly
to the receiving association at any time before thirty days after the date of
consummation of the merger, accompanied by the surrender of his stock
certificates.
Id.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 215a(c)-(d) (1988). Sections 215a(c) and (d) of the National
Bank Act provide in pertinent part:
(c) Valuation of shares
The value of the shares of any dissenting shareholder shall be ascer-
tained, as of the effective date of the merger, by an appraisal made by a
committee of three persons, composed of (1) one selected by the vote of
the holders of the majority of the stock, the owners of which are entitled
to payment in cash; (2) one selected by the directors of the receiving
association; and (3) one selected by the two so selected. The valuation
agreed upon by any two of the three appraisers shall govern. If the value
so fixed shall not be satisfactory to any dissenting shareholder who has
requested payment, that shareholder may, within five days after being no-
tified of the appraised value of his shares, appeal to the Comptroller, who
shall cause a reappraisal to be made which shall be final and binding as to
the value of the shares of the appellant.
(d) Application to shareholders of merging associations: appraisal by
Comptroller; expenses of receiving association; sale and resale of shares;
State appraisal and merger law
If, within ninety days from the date of consummation of the merger,
for any reason one or more of the appraisers is not selected as herein
provided, or the appraisers fail to determine the value of such shares, the
Comptroller shall upon written request of any interested party cause an
appraisal to be made which shall be final and binding on all parties. The
expenses of the Comptroller in making the reappraisal or the appraisal,
as the case may be, shall be paid by the receiving association. The value
of the shares ascertained shall be promptly paid to the dissenting share-
holders by the receiving association. The shares of stock of the receiving
association which would have been delivered to such dissenting share-
holders had they not requested payment shall be sold by the receiving
association at an advertised public auction, and the receiving association
shall have the right to purchase any of such shares at such public auction,
if it is the highest bidder therefor, for the purpose of reselling such
shares within thirty days thereafter to such person or persons and at such
price not less than par as its board of directors by resolution may deter-
mine. If the shares are sold at public auction at a price greater than the
amount paid to the dissenting shareholders, the excess in such sale price
shall be paid to such dissenting shareholders. The appraisal of such
shares of stock in any State bank shall be determined in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the State in such cases, rather than as provided in
this section, if such provision is made in the State law; and no such
merger shall be in contravention of the law of the State under which such
bank is incorporated. The provisions of this subsection shall apply only
to shareholders of (and stock owned by them in) a bank or association
being merged into the receiving association.
3
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merged national bank.4 In Lewis v. Clark,5 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit held that minority shareholders may not,
over their objections, be frozen out and required to take cash for their
shares, because § 215a does not expressly grant statutory authority for
freeze-out mergers. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, however, recently addressed the issue of cash-only freeze-out
mergers in NoDak Bancorporation V. Clarke7 and interpreted § 215a differ-
ently.8 The NoDak court held that a freeze-out merger requiring minority
shareholders to accept solely cash in exchange for their shares is not in-
consistent with the statutory language of § 215a and, therefore, should be
permitted.9
This Note examines the development of freeze-out mergers and the
legislative history and judicial interpretations of § 215a of the National
Bank Act.' 0 Specifically, this Note considers the issue of whether the
Eighth Circuit's decision in NoDak is not inconsistent with the National
Bank Act's statutory scheme." This Note also considers NoDak in light of
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lewis.' 2 Further, this Note addresses the
effects of NoDak on determining minority shareholders' rights in freeze-
out mergers under the National Bank Act.' 3 Finally, this Note suggests an
alternative that balances the rights of both the minority and majority
shareholders.14 This alternative would permit freeze-out mergers to occur
while ensuring that minority shareholders receive a fair value for their
shares.
4. For a further explanation and discussion of freeze-out mergers, see infra
notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
5. 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
6. Id. at 1560. For a further discussion of the Lewis decision, see infra notes
64-72 and accompanying text.
7. 988 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 1420.
9. Id. For a further discussion of NoDak, see infra notes 73-142 and accompa-
nying text.
10. For a discussion of the historical common law treatment of minority
shareholders and the development of freeze-out mergers, see infra notes 15-54 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the legislative history and judicial interpre-
tations of § 215a of the National Bank Act, see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying
text.
11. For a further discussion of the National Bank Act's statutory scheme, see
infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lewis, see
infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the Eighth Circuit's decision in NoDak, see
infra notes 73-142 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the impact of
freeze-out mergers on minority shareholder rights, see infra notes 147-57 and ac-
companying text.
14. For a discussion of an alternative to NoDak, see infra notes 158-72 and
accompanying text.
[Vtol. 39: p. 915
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Perspective: Traditional Common Law Treatment of Minority
Shareholders
Both the historical changes that have taken place in corporation law
and the techniques that have been used to combine corporations set the
stage for consideration of minority shareholders' rights in freeze-out
mergers under the National Bank Act.' 5 In the mid-nineteenth century,
at common law, a corporation could only affect a merger or similar trans-
action if it had the unanimous consent of its shareholders. 16 Courts
viewed the corporate charter as a contract, both among the corporation's
shareholders and between the corporation and the state, under which
every shareholder had vested rights. 17 A shareholder's vested rights in-
15. National bank mergers involve compliance with a complicated matrix of
federal and state laws including corporation, securities and banking regulations.
Pitts & Cranmore, supra note 1, at 789. The bank merger procedures under the
National Bank Act are determined by the laws of the jurisdictions of the participat-
ing banks. Tortoriello, supra note 1, at 77. For a merger involving a bank holding
company, state corporate law governs. Id. For a bank merger in which the ac-
quired bank is a state bank, state banking law governs. Id. Finally, for bank merg-
ers in which the acquired bank is a national bank, § 215a of the National Bank Act
is the governing provision. Id.
16. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Geddes
v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921); Clearwater v. Meredith, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 25, 39-41 (1864); Kean v.Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 409 (1853); Abbot
v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 582-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861); F.
HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.03, at 217 (1975 &
Supp. 1984).
For an in-de pth discussion of the development of shareholder consent re-
quirements to effect a merger or other fundamental corporate changes, see
O'NE.AL, supra, § 3.03, at 217-21; William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes,
Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 69, 77-82
(1980); Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes,
45 HARv. L. RPv. 233, 234-44 (1931); IrvingJ. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 420-22 (1930).
17. Geddes, 254 U.S. at 596; Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753, 755-56
(Ill. 1959); Kean, 9 NJ. Eq. at 414; Garey v. St.Joe Mining Co., 91 P. 369, 371 (Utah
1907). Under the vested rights doctrine, any shareholder could block any funda-
mental change in a corporation's business or charter. Elliot J. Weiss, The Law of
Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 627 (1981). Major-
ity shareholders could attempt to buy off minority shareholders, but the majority
could not use corporate transaction techniques such as freeze-out mergers to ter-
minate minority shareholders' participation in a corporation. Id.
Corporation law has long reflected the contractual rights of partnerships and
joint stock associations in which no power can be exercised without the consent of
all. Carney, supra note 16, at 77. The rights of shareholders were treated similar to
property rights that could not be altered or impaired by legislative enactment. Id.
at 77-78. States and shareholders viewed the corporation as tangible property cre-
ated by a sovereign legislature and owned equally by all the shareholders. Bayless
Manning, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ.
223, 246 (1962). Any fundamental change, such as a merger, that occurred with-
out unanimous consent, violated the common law and threatened the sharehold-
ers' constitutional right of freedom of contract to maintain an equity interest in a
corporation. Charles A. Lynch, A Concern for the Interest of Minority Shareholders
1994] NOTE
5
Ivanovic: Nodak Bancorporation v. Clarke: Redefining the Rights of Minority
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 915
cluded the right to maintain an equity interest in the corporation.1 8
In the late nineteenth century, the common law rule of unanimous
shareholder consent proved to be a formidable restriction on American
corporate growth.' 9 Therefore, state legislatures enacted statutes permit-
ting authorization of a merger or a similar transaction by less than unani-
Under Modern Corporation Laws, 3J. CORP. L. 19, 19 (1977); see also Manning, supra,
at 246 (discussing nineteenth century view on mergers and shareholders' constitu-
tional right of freedom of contract).
18. Accord Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N. Ry., 44 N.E. 1043,
1051 (N.Y. 1896) (enjoining controlling stockholders from foreclosing mortgage
on corporate property when controlling shareholder caused corporation to default
on bonds to acquire corporation's assets); see Wright v. Oroville Gold, Silver, &
Copper Mining Co., 40 Cal. 20, 29 (1870) (holding majority shareholders could
not force minority shareholders to relinquish their equity interest in corporation);
see also Kean, 9 N.J. Eq. at 413-14 (holding proposed sale of corporation without
minority shareholder approval is defective because majority shareholders are not
empowered to force company to sell its assets solely because majority wishes to
terminate its investment).
19. 12B WiLLIAM W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORORATIONS § 5906.10, at 376 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1993) (stating that unanimous
shareholder consent requirement increasingly seen by corporations as "serious im-
pediment[ ] to sweeping reorganizations in structure which modem needs had
made the order of the day"); L.P. Scriggins & David Clarke, Jr., Takeovers and the
1983 Fair Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266, 267-68 (1984) (noting that unani-
mous shareholder consent "proved to be an undesirable restriction on economic
growth"); Weiss, supra note 17, at 629 (stating that unanimous shareholder con-
sent "created a potential for tyranny by the minority, thus impeding economic
progress by blocking desirable commercial transactions"); William S. Allred, Note,
Corporate Law-Chipping Away at the Delaware Block: A Critique of the Delaware Block
Approach to the Valuation of Dissenters' Shares in Appraisal Proceedings, 8 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 191, 195 (1986) (noting common law principle of unanimous shareholder
consent was "unduly burdensome" for corporations with many shareholders and
"hindered economic growth for the companies and the country"); Michelle M.
Pepin, Note, Exclusivity of Appraisal-The Possibility of Extinguishing Shareholder
Claims, 42 CASE WES. L. REv. 955, 958 (1992) (stating that "unanimous consent
proved to be restrictive of corporations' ability to respond to economic and com-
mercial growth"); J. Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting Shareholders'Appraisal Rem-
edy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629, 629-30 (1977) (noting that unanimous shareholder
consent was "not conducive to the growth and stability required of the corporate
entity").
Unanimous shareholder consent was required for corporate changes such as a
sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets, fundamental changes in the
nature of the business by corporate charter amendment, mergers or consolida-
tions, or changes in a corporation's capitalization. Levy, supra note 16, at 420.
State legislatures began to recognize that the requirement for unanimous consent
for fundamental changes in a corporation's organization created potential
problems. Weiss, supra note 17, at 629. A minority shareholder who exercised his
or her single vote could enjoy a tyrannical hold on a corporation and impede
economic progress by blocking any desirable commercial transactions. Id. From
the corporation's standpoint, shifting markets and varying financial requirements
demanded "an ability to adapt to changes and periodically to reorganize corporate
structure in order to remain competitive in the marketplace." Rogers, supra, at
630. To allow the decision of a single stockholder to impede the making of a
necessary business decision would have an adverse effect on the vitality of the cor-
poration. Id.
6
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mous consent, if approved by the corporation's board of directors and a
majority or supermajority of its shareholders. 20 These statutes typically
granted dissenting shareholders an appraisal right-the right to relin-
quish their stock in return for its appraised cash value instead of exchang-
ing their stock for stock in the newly-merged corporation. 21
Despite the availability of minority shareholders' appraisal rights,
many courts remained hostile to majority shareholders' attempts to force
out minority shareholders.2 2 For example, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bo-
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991) (merger or consolidation);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1991) (sale of assets); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275
(1991) (voluntary dissolution); see also 1896 N.Y. LAws 994 (voluntary dissolution
and merger) (current version at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 901(a) (1) (merger),
§§ 1001-02 (voluntary dissolution) (McKinney 1986)). Today, all states have some
statute providing that unanimity is no longer a requirement for shareholders to
approve fundamental corporate changes such as mergers, liquidations or asset
sales. FLETCHER, supra note 19, § 5906.10, at 376; Note, The Short Merger Statute, 32
U. Cm. L. REv. 596, 597 (1965) [hereinafter Note, The Short Merger Statute].
21. See, e.g., 21 DEL. LAWS 273 (1899); 1896 NJ. LAws 185. Early merger and
consolidation statutes generally did not create the potential for minority share-
holders to be frozen out of the newly merged corporation because all shareholders
were entitled to receive common stock in the surviving corporation. Robert B.
Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the "New" Appraisal Remedy, 63 WASH. U. L.Q.
415, 418 (1984); ElliotJ. Weiss, Balancing Interests In Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1983). Nevertheless, one com-
mentator has suggested that such a potential still existed. Jeffrey A. Fillman, Cash
and Property as Consideration in a Merger or Consolidation, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 837, 852-
53 (1968). For example, Fillman has suggested that in a stock-for-stock merger,
the minority shareholders could be offered consideration so inadequate that they
are effectively forced to accept the cash appraised value for their shares instead of
stock in the merged corporation. Id. at 852. Also, controlling shareholders desir-
ing to freeze-out minority shareholders could issue short-term debt or fractional
shares to the minority shareholders in exchange for the minority shareholders'
shares, thereby effectively preventing the minority shareholders' participation in
the newly-merged company. Id. at 853.
Some courts invalidated early merger statutes because such statutes did not
provide the dissenting minority shareholders with cash payments for their shares.
See, e.g., Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 48-49 (1858) (holding that
dissenting shareholders cannot be compelled to accept stock of merged corpora-
tion, but are entitled to cash value of shares); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills,
113 Va. 717, 724 (1912) (holding that dissenting shareholders are not required to
exchange old shares for shares of newly-merged company, but are entitled to cash
value of shares). Consequently, in most states, legislatures enacted statutes that
gave dissenters the right to request an appraisal where the majority and minority
shareholders could not reach an agreement as to the value of the dissenters' shares
and to demand the appraised cash value for their shares. FLETCHER, supra note 19,
§ 5906.10, at 376; Levy, supra note 16, at 421; Allred, supra note 19, at 197-98.
Today, all states and the District of Columbia have statutes that provide for
dissenter and appraisal rights upon the occurrence of specified events. FLETCHER,
supra note 19, § 5906.10, at 376; Michael G. Schinner, Dissenting Shareholders' Statu-
tory Right to Fair Cash Value: Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 22 AKRON L. REv. 261,
265 n.32 (1989); Allred, supra note 19, at 198 n.32-33. Although these statutes vary
in scope and form, nearly all provide for appraisal rights upon a merger or consoli-
dation. Id. at 199 n.35.
22. Weiss, supra note 17, at 629;Julie Gwyn Hudson, Comment, The Exclusivity
of the Appraisal Remedy Under the North Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the
1994] NOTE
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gert,23 the United States Supreme Court considered a minority sharehold-
ers' challenge to a merger in which the controlling shareholders of a
corporation attempted to exclude the minority shareholders from equity
participation in the newly merged corporation.24 In 1913, the minority
shareholders of the old Houston Company brought suit in the Supreme
Court of New York against Southern Pacific, old Houston Company's ma-
jority shareholder.2 5 The minority shareholders sought to have Southern
Pacific declared the trustee for them in the stock of the newly-merged
Houston Company and for an accounting.2 6 The United States Court of
Standard of Review for Cash-Out Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 501, 506 (1991). Weiss
stated that the courts' hostility to freeze-out mergers was due to the fact that "no
state legislature expressly granted [the power] to a corporation or its majority
shareholders... to force minority [shareholders] to relinquish ... [their] inter-
est." Weiss, supra note 17, at 629; see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483, 492 (1919) (requiring that controlling shareholders offer minority sharehold-
ers equity interest in merged corporation); Small v. Small, 157 N.E. 261, 264 (N.Y.
1927) (same). Courts considered "the preservation of minority shareholders' eq-
uity interests to be necessary to stimulate investment, to enforce the [fiduciary]
obligations of [majority] shareholders ... or to [enforce] the state legislatures'
presumed intent to approve only real dissolutions, not ... transactions that [do
not] involve changes in the nature . . .of the dissolved corporation's business."
Weiss, supra note 17, at 630; see, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F.
625, 635 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (granting minority shareholders lien on property ex-
propriated by majority based on majority shareholders' fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders to allow them to participate in gain from sale of property); In re
Paine, 166 N.W. 1036, 1038-39 (Mich. 1918) (granting minority shareholders in-junction against dissolution by majority shareholders because state legislature did
not intend to allow dissolution of successful company); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 152-53 (N.Y. 1919) (granting cause of action to minor-
ity shareholders frozen out in reorganization because majority shareholders ap-
proved reorganization in bad faith and for personal gain, in violation of fiduciary
duties to minority shareholders); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P. 1004,
1007 (Wash. 1904) (granting minority shareholders injunction against fraudulent
dissolution by majority shareholders of solvent business where dissolved corpora-
tion's business would continue in new corporation formed by majority
shareholders).
23. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
24. Id. at 498. Southern Pacific Company (Southern Pacific) dominated the
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, electing directors and officers
through one of its subsidiaries, which was a majority owner of the Houston Com-
pany stock. Bogert v. Southern Pac. Co., 226 F. 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd,
244 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1917), modified, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). In 1888, pursuant to a
reorganization agreement, Southern Pacific dissolved the Houston Company and
transferred its liabilities to Houston & Texas Railway Company. Id. at 504. The
old Houston Company's bonds were exchanged for bonds of the new company,
and all of the new Houston Company's stock was delivered to Southern Pacific. Id.
at 505. However, the old Houston Company's minority shareholders did not re-
ceive any shares in the new Houston Company. Id. at 506.
25. Bogert, 250 U.S. at 486.
26. Id. The case was originally removed to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, where the court, after a hearing on the evidence,
entered a decree for the minority shareholders. Id. at 487 (citing Bogert v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 226 F. 500, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 244 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1917),
modified, 250 U.S. 483 (1919)). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
[Vol. 39: p. 915
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Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the majority shareholders owed a
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders and, on appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed. 2 7 The Supreme Court suggested that the
majority shareholders' fiduciary obligation is best fulfilled by requiring the
majority to offer the minority shareholders a stock interest in the new
corporation. 28
B. The Development of Freeze-Out Mergers
After World War II, the position of minority shareholders eroded as
newly enacted cash merger statutes permitted only cash, rather than stock
in the newly-merged corporation, to be distributed to the minority share-
holders of the corporations involved in the transaction.2 9 The concept of
the Second Circuit affirmed the decree. Id. (citing Bogert v. Southern Pacific Co.,
244 F. 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1917), modified, 250 U.S. 483 (1919)).
27. Id. at 487-88.
28. See id. The Supreme Court stated:
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled and has
been often applied. The majority has the right to control; but when it
does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as
the corporation itself or its officers and directors. If through that control
a sale of the corporate property is made and the property acquired by the
majority, the minority may not be excluded from a fair participation in
the fruits of its sale.
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 19, at 268; Thompson, supra note 21, at
418; Weiss, supra note 17, at 648. Florida enacted the first cash merger statute in
1925, which provided for the distribution of cash, notes or bonds. Weiss, supra
note 17, at 632; see also Act of June 1, 1925, ch. 10096, § 36, 1925 FLA. LAws 134
(current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1102 (West 1993) (cash merger statute)).
By 1931, Arkansas, California and Ohio had also enacted cash merger statutes.
Weiss, supra note 17, at 632; see also Act of April 1, 1931, Act 255, ch. 1, § 61, 1931
ARK. ACTs 860 (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1001 (Michie 1987) (cash
merger statute)); GENERAL CORP. LAw, ch. 862, § 361, 1931 CAt.. STAT. 1809 (cur-
rent version at CAL. CORP. CODE § I101(d) (West 1977) (cash merger statute));
General Corp. Act § 8623-67, 1927 OHIo LAws 35 (current version at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (Anderson 1992) (cash merger statute)).
In 1936, New York was the first state to adopt a short-form merger statute that
permitted the use of cash. Weiss, supra note 17, at 641; Hudson, supra note 22, at
507 n.32; see also Act of May 28, 1936, ch. 778, § 1(1), 1936 N.Y. LAws 1658 (cur-
rent version at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 905(a) (3) (McKinney 1986) (short-form
merger statute)). A short-form merger statute permits: (1) a corporation that
owns at least 90% of the stock of another corporation to merge the two corpora-
tions upon approval vote by the acquiring corporation's board of directors; and
(2) cash to be the only form of consideration paid by the parent to the minority
shareholders under the merger plan. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 1120 (6th ed. 1988). Long-form merger statutes have no
threshold ownership requirement but do require the directors and shareholders of
both corporations to vote on the proposed merger. Hudson, supra note 22, at 507
n.32. In 1957, Delaware adopted a short-form merger statute, modelled after the
New York statute, that permitted cash as consideration in a merger. Weiss, supra
note 17, at 648; see also Act of June 5, 1957, ch. 121, § 253(a), 51 DEL. LAws 186
(1957) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1991) (allowing cash as
merger consideration)).
9
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the freeze-out merger was developed pursuant to these new statutes. 30
Frequently employed as a method of eliminating minority shareholders,
the freeze-out merger derived its name from the fact that the minority
shareholders who are forced to take cash for their shares are "frozen out"
of the merged corporation.31 This freeze-out merger results in the major-
ity shareholders owning a 100% equity interest in the surviving
Although legislatures allowed cash as merger consideration, widespread adop-
tion of cash as a permissible form of consideration did not occur until the 1960s.
Hudson, supra note 22, at 507 n.32. For example, in 1961, New York allowed the
use of "cash and other consideration" and in 1962 the "and" was changed to "or."
Id.; see also Act of April 24, 1961, ch. 855, § 902(a) (3), 1961 N.Y. LAws 1629 (cur-
rent version at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 902(a) (3) (McKinney 1986) (allowing cash
or other consideration)). In 1967, Delaware amended its long-form merger statute
to permit cash as consideration. Weiss, supra note 17, at 648; Hudson, supra note
22, at 507 n.32; see also General Corp. Law, ch. 50, § 251 (b) (4), 56 DEL. LAWS 206
(1967) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (1991) (permitting
cash as consideration)). In 1969, North Carolina amended its long-form statute to
permit the use of cash as consideration in a merger. Hudson, supra note 22, at 507
& n.32; see also Act ofJune 11, 1969, ch. 751, § 37, 1969 N.C. SEss. LAw 780 (codi-
fied as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-106(b)(4) (1982) and replaced by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-11-01(b)(3) (1990) (permitting cash as consideration)).
30. Weiss, supra note 17, at 650; Hudson, supra note 22, at 507. A freeze-out
merger is often also described as a "take-out," "squeeze-out" or "cash-out" merger.
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 21, at 415 n.2 (discussing various terminology used
to describe corporate transactions designed to eliminate minority shareholders
from continued equity participation). For purposes of this Note, the term "freeze-
out" merger will be used consistent with the terminology in NoDak.
For an in-depth discussion of the history and development of freeze out merg-
ers, see generally Carolyn Berger & Thomas J. Allingham II, A New Light on Cash-
Out Mergers: Weinberger Elipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAw. 1 (1983); Victor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeeouts, 87 YALE LJ. 1354 (1978);
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ.
663 (1974).
Weiss provides an excellent historical overview by tracing the development of
freeze-out mergers through five phases. Weiss, supra note 17, at 627-80. In phase
one, under the vested rights doctrine, every shareholder had the right to retain his
or her stock interest in a corporation, as well as the right to veto any fundamental
corporate change. Id. at 627-29. In phase two, which involved a retreat from the
vested rights doctrine, legislatures permitted a corporation's board of directors to
authorize any change in a corporation's business or charter, provided it was ap-
proved by a majority or supermajority of the corporation's shareholders. Id. at
629-31. In phase three, legislatures began to liberalize corporate laws further by
enacting statutes that allowed the use of cash as consideration in mergers. Id. at
632-41. In phase four, states enacted additional cash merger statutes that the
courts interpreted as expressly authorizing freeze-out mergers. Id. at 641-57. In
phase five, the courts began to apply a business purpose and fairness test to deter-
mine the validity of a freeze-out merger. Id. at 658-80. In a subsequent article,
Weiss discusses phase six of the development in which courts seek to protect mi-
nority shareholders through a liberalized appraisal process rather than through
the determination of whether the proposed transaction was properly motivated.
ElliotJ. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Merger Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers In Phase
Six, 4 CARDozo L. Rlv. 245 (1983).
31. Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 987, 989 (1974); Hudson, supra note 22, at 507.
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corporation.3 2
Commentators have suggested that legislatures, in enacting the first
cash merger statutes, did not intend either explicitly or implicitly to au-
thorize freeze-out mergers as a means of eliminating minority sharehold-
ers.33 Courts, however, have interpreted cash merger statutes to permit
32. Borden, supra note 31, at 989; Hudson, supra note 22, at 507. Commenta-
tors generally separate freeze-out mergers into three categories: (1) the multi-step;
(2) the parent-subsidiary; and (3) the going private freeze-out merger. Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 30, at 1357-76; Michael D. Goldman & DonaldJ. Wolfe,Jr.,
In Response to A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683,
688-98 (1979); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis,
28 STAN. L. Rv. 487, 491-97, Glenn Cartsen Campbell, Note, Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.: Delaware Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers, 62 N.C. L. REv.
812, 812 n.3 (1984);John P. McGarrity, Note, Freezeouts Under the 1983 Illinois Busi-
ness Corporation Act: The Need for Protection of Minority Shareholders From "Going Pri-
vate" Mergers, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 679, 681-83.
A multi-step freeze-out merger involves two separate transactions. McGarrity,
supra, at 681. The first transaction involves the acquiring corporation making a
tender offer to the target corporation's shareholders to obtain a controlling inter-
est in the target. Id. In the second transaction, the acquiring corporation with a
controlling interest in the target then votes to merge the target into the acquiring
corporation. Id. The acquiring corporation gives cash consideration to the target
corporation's shareholders who sold their shares in the tender offer, resulting in
the acquiring corporation obtaining 100% ownership in the target. Id. 681-82.
However, the minority shareholders of the target corporation, who refused to sell
their shares in the tender offer, are frozen out from an equity interest in the newly-
merged corporation. Id. at 682.
In a parent-subsidiary freeze-out merger, the parent corporation merges the
subsidiary into the parent by using a short-form merger statute, which requires that
the parent own a specified percentage in the subsidiary, usually 90-95%. Id. at 682
& n.18. The short-form merger statute allows the parent to freeze-out the subsidi-
ary's minority shareholders by requiring them to take cash for their equity interest.
Id. at 683. For a discussion of the development of short-form merger statutes, see
supra, note 29.
In a going private merger, the owners of the original target corporation are its
controlling shareholders at the time of the proposed merger. McGarrity, supra, at
683. The controlling shareholders create a shell corporation and transfer its con-
trolling interest in the target in exchange for shares in the shell corporation. Id.
The shell corporation, having the controlling interest in the shell, then votes to
merge the target into the shell. Id. Because the shell corporation gives cash in
exchange for the shares in the target, the minority shareholders of the original
target are frozen out from an equity interest in the newly-merged corporate entity
(i.e., the shell corporation). Id. The controlling shareholders then own 100% of
the shell corporation. Id. The going private merger often allows the controlling
shareholder to take the merged corporation off a public stock exchange and avoid
SEC reporting requirements and expenses. Id. at 683 & n.23.
33. Thompson, supra note 21, at 418; Hudson, supra note 22, at 507. Weiss,
however, contended that the first cash mergers statutes implicitly authorized and
facilitated freeze-out mergers. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 633 (stating that "it can
be argued that [because] mergers usually contemplate the continuation of one of
the merging corporations, allowing cash to be used as the sole consideration in a
merger must serve the purpose of authorizing take outs of minority shareholder").
Weiss stated that the "first cash merger statutes were enacted as part of a general
effort to provide additional flexibility in the structuring of mergers," because cash
could be used to effect a business combination or reorganization that resulted in a
1994] NOTE
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the elimination of minority shareholders.3 4 The earliest case supporting a
freeze-out under a cash merger statute was Beloff v. Consolidated Edison,
Co. 3 5 Beloff was a former minority shareholder of Consolidated Edison.3 6
Having been frozen out under New York's short-form merger statute, Bel-
off brought a suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute, claiming
that it altered his vested right to retain his shareholder status.3 7 On ap-
peal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the intermediate appellate
court's decision and held that a shareholder did not have a vested right to
continue his or her shareholder status after a merger.38 Rather, the court
of appeals stated that "the merged corporation's shareholder has only one
freeze out of minority shareholders. Id. at 641; see also Victor Brudney, Equal Treat-
ment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REv.
1072, 1097 n.69 (1983) (noting that long-form and short-form merger statutes con-
templated payment of cash to all shareholders, thereby allowing freeze-outs of mi-
nority shareholders). One commentator suggested that federal tax law changes in
the 1960s, which permitted certain types of reorganizations to be nontaxable, mo-
tivated state legislatures to amend merger statutes to allow cash to be used as con-
sideration. Russell M. Robinson, II, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C. L.
REv. 515, 517 (1983). Robinson also notes that the legislatures "probably did not
foresee that [cash merger statutes] would be used as a means to eliminate minority
shareholders." Id.
34. See Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311, 317 (Conn. 1979) (holding
that appraisal rights are exclusive remedy for dissenters under Connecticut short-
form merger statute); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del.
1962) (noting that Delaware's short-form merger statute provides majority share-
holders with convenient method to freeze-out minority shareholders); David J.
Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35-36 (Del. Ch. 1971) (allowing
freeze-out of minority shareholders' interests under Delaware's long-form merger
statute); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893, 896-97 (Del. Ch.
1959) (holding that purpose of Delaware's short-form merger statute is to allow
parent to pay minority shareholders cash and thereby eliminate minority share-
holders' interest in merged corporation); Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
322 N.E.2d 54, 56 (I11. 1974) (stating that purpose of short-form merger statute is
"to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority share-
holders' interests in the subsidiary"); Pupecki v.James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d
1030, 1033 (Mass. 1979) (refusing to enjoin freeze-out asset sale and stating that
appraisal is exclusive remedy in absence of fraud); Willcox v. Stern, 219 N.E.2d
401, 404 (N.Y. 1966) (stating that New York merger statute "clearly anticipates a
'cash payout' by which minority stockholders may be frozen out of continued par-
ticipation in the merged corporation"); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 87
N.E.2d 561, 565 (N.Y. 1949) (holding minority shareholder's only right is to ap-
praisal); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(refusing to enjoin freeze-out asset sale because minority shareholders have ap-
praisal remedy); Blumner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694
(Sup. Ct. 1950) (same).
35. 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949).
36. Id. at 563.
37. Id. at 564-65. The trial court and the appellate court held that the statute
was constitutional and dismissed Beloff's cause of action. Id. at 563.
38. Id. at 564. The Court of Appeals noted that the state legislature has the
right under the state constitution to alter, suspend or repeal the charters of the
corporation. Id. The court also noted that the constitutional provision that grants
legislatures the authority to alter corporate charters is part of the contract or char-
ter of every New York corporation. Id.
926
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real right; to have the value of his [or her] holding protected, and that
protection is given him [or her] by the right to an appraisal."3 9
In light of the state courts' increasing support for freeze-out mergers,
minority shareholders sought relief in the federal courts.40 Minority
shareholders claimed that freeze-out mergers resulted in an undervalua-
tion of their shares, thereby violating the antifraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws.4 1 At first, these minority shareholders achieved some
39. Id. at 564. The court stated:
[The minority shareholder] has no right to stay in the picture, to go
along into the merger, or to share in its future benefits. [The minority
shareholder] has no constitutional right to deliberate, consult or vote on
the merger, to have prior notice thereof or prior opportunity to object
thereto.
Id. at 564-65.
The Beloff court further noted that such restrictions are a result of the share-
holder's "status as a member of [the] minority." Id. at 565. The court stated that
only the legislature can authorize any needed reforms for the minority sharehold-
ers. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded by holding that the merger did not de-
prive the minority shareholders of their property rights without the due process of
law or impair their contract rights. Id.
40. Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HAS.
TINGS L.J. 377, 402-07 (1985); Weiss, supra note 21, at 25. State courts did not
enforce majority shareholders' fiduciary duties and forced minority shareholders
to seek injunctive relief in federal courts under claims of securities fraud for
breach of fiduciary duty. Thompson, supra note 21, at 419; McGarrity, supra note
32, at 693. For a discussion of federal court cases involving freeze-out mergers, see
infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
41. Siegel, supra note 40, at 402; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 693-94. In early
freeze-out merger cases, plaintiffs sued under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.L § 240.10b-5
(1984), promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 7.09, at 464-65; Siegel, supra note 40, at 402 n.118; Weiss,
supra note 21, at 25; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 693. Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
Id.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
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limited success in the federal courts. 4 2 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,43 however, the United States Supreme Court stated its current posi-
tion that absent fraud, a fully disclosed freeze-out merger does not fall
within the limits of the federal securities law, and therefore is allowed. 44
In Santa Fe, the minority shareholders of a subsidiary of Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc., a Delaware corporation, were frozen out in a merger and
forced to accept an appraised cash value for their shares. 45 The minority
shareholders asserted that their stock interests were fraudulently ap-
praised at an inadequate price.46 Further, the minority shareholders
claimed that the merger constituted a "device, scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5. 47 The
minority shareholders also claimed that Santa Fe undertook the merger
without any prior notice and that the merger lacked any justifiable busi-
ness purpose because the merger's sole purpose was to eliminate the mi-
nority shareholders. 48 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the case, finding that Santa Fe had made
full disclosure. 49 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1281 (2d Cir. 1976)
(enjoining freeze-out merger benefiting only majority shareholders pursuant to
Rule lOb-5); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating
that exchange of shares in merger of two corporations was sufficient to state Rule
lOb-5 cause of action), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); Schilick v. Penn-Dixie Ce-
ment Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974) (utilizing Rule 10b-5 to protect mi-
nority shareholders in freeze-out merger involving manipulation of market value
of minority shareholders' interests), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Bryan v. Bock
& Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1974) (utilizing Rule 10b-5 to pro-
tect minority shareholders in forced sale of minority shareholders' interest to ma-
jority shareholders), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Box v. Northrop Corp., 423
F. Supp. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying majority shareholders' motion to dismiss
based on Rule lOb-5 because majority's attempt to eliminate minority sharehold-
ers' interests resulted in unjust enrichment to majority shareholders); Seigal v.
Merrick, 422 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying majority shareholders'
motion to dismiss based on Rule lOb-5 where majority attempted to eliminate mi-
nority shareholders to protect personal interests); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F.
Supp. 754, 757 (D. Utah 1974) (voiding merger based on Rule lob-5 where freeze-
out involved fraud and deceit to minority shareholders).
43. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
44. Id. at 473.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id. at 467. The sum Santa Fe offered was $150 per share and the price the
minority shareholders suggested was $772 per share. Id.
47. Id. For the pertinent text of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see supra note 41.
48. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 468.
49. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 854-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
rev'd, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Specifically, the
district court held that because Santa Fe made full disclosure of the transaction,
14
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in part, stating that Rule 10b-5 encompassed both informational and con-
structive fraud. 50 The Second Circuit held that the minority shareholders'
complaint stated a federal cause of action because the appraisal remedy
under Delaware law was inadequate and Santa Fe lacked a business pur-
pose in consummating the merger.5 1
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit on the grounds that Santa Fe made full disclosure of the merger to
the minority shareholders, therefore there were no "deceptive [or] manip-
ulative" practices in violation of Rule 10b-5. 52 The Supreme Court held
that the minority shareholders' sole remedy, if dissatisfied with the terms
of the merger, was to seek an appraisal proceeding as provided under Del-
aware state law.55 As a result, federal courts forced minority shareholders
to accept limited redress in state courts.54
there was no § 10(b) violation. Id. The court also held that Rule lOb-5 does not
override Delaware corporate law procedures, which do not require prior notice or
a business purpose for a short-form merger. Id. at 853.
50. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
51. Id. at 1291.
52. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977).
53. Id. at 474 n.14. The Court explained that it would be inappropriate for
the federal courts to interpret Rule lOb-5 to prohibit transactions that are permissi-
ble under state law and are neither deceptive or manipulative. Id. at 473-76. Inter-
preting the statutory language of Rule 1Ob-5, the Supreme Court stated:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to fed-
eralize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden.... There may well be a need
for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that
challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied
by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule 101>5 to 'cover the corporate
universe.'
Id. at 479-80 (footnote omitted). Although the Santa Fe Court suggested the need
for federal fiduciary standards, it concluded that federal courts could not create
such standards under the language of Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 478-79; see also Bruce Martin Mundorf, Note, Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green: The Supreme Court Reaffirms the Necessity of Non-Disclosure to
Maintain an Action Under Rule 10b-5, 3 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 76 (1979) (discussing Rule
10b-5 and breach of fiduciary aspects of Santa Fe); Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciay
Duty Under Rule lOb-5 AfterSanta Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1874
(1978) (same).
54. Siegel, supra note 40, at 402; Weiss, supra note 17, at 657. Under the
threat of possible congressional action to create federal fiduciary standards as sug-
gested in Santa F the Delaware Supreme Court responded through a series of
landmark decisions that expanded the use of state law fiduciary duties to limit
majority shareholders' statutory rights in freeze-out mergers. Thompson, supra
note 21, at 420; see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Roland
Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox Corp., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121
(Del. 1977).
Following the Santa Fe decision, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Singer, held
that compliance with the long-form merger statutes would no longer validate a
freeze-out merger. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. Specifically, the court stated that a
15
Ivanovic: Nodak Bancorporation v. Clarke: Redefining the Rights of Minority
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
930 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 915
C. The National Bank Act and Freeze-Out Mergers
Although the states have enacted the majority of corporation and
bank merger statutes, § 215a of the National Bank Act governs mergers
involving national banks.55 Section 215a does not specifically address
freeze-out mergers. However, the legislative history of § 215a indicates
Congress' intent to simplify the consolidation of national banks.56 Addi-
tionally, amendments to § 215a in 1952 and 1959 attest to Congress' desire
to facilitate the merger of national banks. 57
long-form merger, "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockhold-
ers, is an abuse of the corporate process; and... [supports] a cause of action for
violation of fiduciary duty." Id. The court required majority shareholders to satisfy
their fiduciary duties to minority shareholders by establishing a valid business pur-
pose for freeze-out mergers. Id. In addition, the court required the majority
shareholders to prove that the freeze-out mergers are entirely fair to the minority
shareholders under the "entire fairness" test established in Sterling v. Mayflower Ho-
tel Corp., which refers to the court's scrutiny of the entire fairness of the transaction
as a whole. Id. at 976 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-
10 (Del. 1952)); see also Roland, 407 A.2d at 1036 (holding that fiduciary require-
ments of Singer are equally applicable to short-form freeze-out mergers).
The Singer business purpose test was eroded in Tanzer, where the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the business purpose test is satisfied even if the merger
serves only the interest of the majority shareholders. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123. In
Tanzer, the court found that the majority shareholders' self-interested motive of
effecting a merger to obtain long-term financing was a valid business purpose. Id.
at 1123-24.
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court established a new standard for
freeze-out mergers. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. Reversing Singer, Roland and
Tanzer in part, the Weinberger court held that majority shareholders did not need a
valid business purpose to effect a freeze-out merger, but if a freeze-out merger
involved a conflict of interests, the majority shareholders must establish the "entire
fairness" of the transaction through a fair price and fair dealing for the minority
shareholders. Id. at 711. The Weinberger court shifted the burden of proving fraud
or unfairness on the minority shareholders if the freeze-out had been approved by
an informed vote of the minority shareholders. Id. at 703. If the minority share-
holders could not specify acts of "fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate
waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching," the minority share-
holders' sole remedy was a statutorily mandated appraisal as modified by Wein-
berger. Id. at 714-15. For a further discussion of the Weinberger "entire fairness" test
and appraisal remedy, see infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a)-(d) (1988). For the pertinent text of 12 § U.S.C.
215a, see supra notes 1-3.
56. H.R. REP. No. 408 to accompany H.R. No. 10205, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1918). The House Report stated:
It is the purpose of this bill to remove the necessity of liquidation and
permit the consolidation to take place upon the affirmative vote of the
stockholders of each association, such consolidation being permitted
under the charter of either of the existing banks. Proper provision is
made by the proposed law to protect any dissenting stockholder in either
corporation, who does not desire to be connected with the consolidated
bank.
Id.
57. S. REP. No. 730, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2232; H.R. REP. No. 2421, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2133-34. When Congress amended § 215a(b) in 1952, Con-
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Caselaw interpreting the various sections of the National Bank Act
indicates that courts have adopted the view that the appraisal process ade-
quately protects shareholders. 58 For example, in Bloomington National
Bank v. Tefler,59 the majority shareholders of Bloomington National Bank
attempted to gain 100% ownership of the bank through a reorganization
plan involving a merger. 60 The minority shareholders, frozen out in the
merger without appraisal rights, claimed that the reorganization violated
the National Bank Act.6 1 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
gress intended to bring the National Bank Act in parity with state statutes. 1952
U.S.C.CA.N. at 2134.
Prior to 1952, federal law provided that any shareholder dissenting to a pro-
posed merger could obtain the cash value of the shares held, that is, both the
dissenters holding the acquired bank stock and dissenters who held the acquiring
bank stock. Id. at 2133. However, many state statutes provided that only the dis-
senters who held acquired bank shares were entitled to cash appraisal rights. Id.
Therefore, consolidation under federal law was less advantageous than under state
law because the banks were more likely to pay appraisal value to dissenters. Id. at
2133-34. Congress enacted the change to § 215a(b) to ensure parity between the
federal and state systems by granting appraisal rights only to dissenters who had
held the acquired bank's stock. Id. at 2134.
Similarly, when Congress last amended the merger provisions of the National
Bank Act in 1959, the Senate Report stated:
The amendments.., were intended only to improve the procedural and
technical provisions relating to consolidations and mergers. The commit-
tee did not intend to affect in any way the substantive authority of banks
to consolidate or merge, or the substantive authority of the Comptroller
of the Currency to review and approve such consolidations and mergers.
S. REP. No. 730, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.CA.N. 2232,
2237. These improvements sought to "eliminate certain existing ambiguities" in
the procedural requirements. Id.
58. See, e.g., NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1423 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that minority shareholders are adequately protected through ap-
praisal process); Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1553
(10th Cir. 1992) (noting that Comptroller's appraisal of dissenting shareholders'
interest is appropriate remedy); Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 916 F.2d 1305,
1308 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that appraisal right provides adequate protection to
minority shareholders); Beerly v. Department of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 946 (7th
Cir. 1985) (noting that appraisal process protects shareholders by giving the cash
equivalent of relinquished stock ownership), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986);
Nehring v. First DeKalb Bancshares, Inc., 692 F.2d 1138, 1141 n.8 (7th Cir. 1982)
(noting that dissenting shareholders' rights are protected through appraisal under
§ 215a(c)). But see Lewis v. Clark, 991 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (holding that without express statutory authority allowing freeze-out
mergers, minority shareholders are not adequately protected through appraisal
rights). For a further discussion of Bloomington, see infra notes 59-63 and accompa-
nying text. For a further discussion of Lewis, see infra notes 64-72 and accompany-
ing text. For a further discussion of NoDak, see infra notes 73-142 and
accompanying text.
59. 916 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1307.
61. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
granted summary judgment to the minority shareholders. Id. The district court
held that the reorganization violated § 215a of the National Bank Act by not giving
the minority shareholders appraisal rights. Id.
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for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Bloom-
ington's action of reacquiring its capital stock at a price significantly lower
than the current stipulated value violated the dissenting shareholders' ap-
praisal rights provided by the National Bank Act.62 The Seventh Circuit
indicated that the minority shareholders were not adequately protected in
such a reorganization plan because the minority shareholders were frozen
out in violation of their appraisal rights. 63
Despite increasing judicial acceptance of freeze-out mergers, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Lewis v. Clark,"
reinstated the traditional view of minority shareholders' rights by provid-
ing complete protection for minority shareholders. 65 In Lewis, the Comp-
troller approved a bank merger in which Lewis State Bank's minority
shareholders received cash in exchange for their shares, while the majority
shareholders received stock in the newly-merged national bank.6 6 The mi-
nority shareholders brought an action in district court challenging the
Comptroller's decision.6 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court.6a The Eleventh Circuit
held that absent express statutory authority, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has no authority to approve a freeze-out merger of a bank where the
minority shareholders are forced to take cash instead of stock in the
merged bank.69 The Lewis court adopted the equity tradition of protect-
62. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
Bloomington has attempted to do nothing more than squeeze-out the
minority shareholders by repurchasing its stock and reducing it to frac-
tional shares through a reverse stock split, thereby necessitating the
bank's purchase of the fractional shares. The district court correctly con-
cluded that the bank's plan "was, at best, a clever little scheme having
only the color of legality and cannot be upheld."
Id. at 1308-09 (quoting Bloomington National Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190,
194 (S.D. Ind. 1988)).
63. Id. at 1308. The Seventh Circuit noted that "courts have recognized Con-
gress's [sic] interest in protecting the rights of a bank's minority shareholders.
Congress has provided appraisal rights to those stockholders when attempts are
made to eliminate them. Id. (citing Beerly v. Department of Treasury, 768 F.2d
942, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986)).
64. 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 1561.
66. Id. at 1559-60.
67. Id. at 1560. The district court upheld the Comptroller's approval of the
merger. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Lewis court noted that § 215a of the National Bank Act authorizes
the use of cash as consideration for stock in mergers. Id. at 1560-61. However, the
statute does not specifically state that the minority shareholders are required to
accept cash "where not all stockholders are required to accept cash." Id. at 1561
(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit concluded by stating that it did "not dis-
cern the permissive and explicit authority from Congress that is necessary to sup-
port the Comptroller's approval of the take out merger in this banking case." Id.
(citing Bloomington National Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190, 193-94 (S.D. Ind.
1988)).
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ing minority shareholders set forth in Bogert.70 The Eleventh Circuit fur-
ther stated that "if owners of the same class of stock are to be treated
differently, there should be some specific decision to that effect by Con-
gress."71 In addition, the Lewis court refused to accept the emerging view
that minority shareholders are adequately protected in a bank merger
through appraisal rights. 7 2
Il. NoDAK BANCORPORA TiO V. CLARKE
In NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke,73 the Eighth Circuit considered
whether the merger of two national banks in North Dakota, which re-
quired the minority shareholders of the acquired bank to accept cash in
exchange for their stock, was inconsistent with § 215a of the National
Bank Act.7 4 NoDak, a minority shareholder, contended that the merger
violated § 215a because it denied the minority shareholders any possibility
of receiving shares in the merged corporation. 75 The Eighth Circuit ex-
amined the legislative history and statutory language of § 215a, as well as
the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lewis v. Clark,76 to determine the validity
of the merger and whether the merger was not inconsistent with the Na-
tional Bank Act.7 7
Prior to the merger at issue, Liberty National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of Dickinson (Liberty) operated as a national bank in North Da-
kota.78 Dickinson Bancorporation, Inc. (Dickinson), a bank holding
company, was the majority shareholder in Liberty. 79 Minority shareholders
included private individuals and NoDak, also a bank holding company.8 0
70. Id. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's
opinion that because the control position of the minority shareholders was dissimi-
lar to that of the majority, the minority was not entitled to equal treatment. Id.
The Lewis court noted that the district court's position was contrary to the "long
standing equity tradition of protection of minority shareholders in American juris-
prudence." Id. (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1919)).
71. Id.
72. Id. The Lewis court stated that in the absence of legislative history re-
jecting the traditional view of protecting minority shareholders, it cannot be said
that the legislature intended to depart from that tradition. Id. (citing Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 709-12 (1980) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)). For a discussion of the emerging view that minority shareholders are
adequately protected through appraisal rights, see supra notes 58-63 and accompa-
nying text.
73. 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 1420. For the pertinent text of 12 U.S.C. § 215a, see supra notes 1-3.
75. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418.
76. 911 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). For a further discus-
sion of Lewis, see supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
77. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419-21.
78. Id. at 1417.
79. Id.
80. Id. Specifically, Dickinson owned 73% of Liberty's outstanding shares. Id.
NoDak and private individuals owned 21% and 6%, respectively. Id.
19941 NOTE 933
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In January 1990, Liberty's board of directors approved a merger plan
in which Liberty would merge with an interim bank called the New Liberty
National Bank (New Liberty).8 1 Under the proposed merger plan, the
resulting bank would operate under the existing name of Liberty National
Bank and Trust Company.82 The plan also required the minority share-
holders in the original Liberty to exchange their shares for cash, thereby
leaving Dickinson as Liberty's sole shareholder upon the completion of
the merger.8 3 In March 1990, pursuant to the National Bank Act, Liberty
initiated and sought approval of the proposed merger from the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller).84 Not wishing to cash in
its equity interest, Nodak filed a written objection to the proposed merger
plan with the Comptroller.8 5 NoDak set forth the following arguments:
(1) the proposed merger lacked a legitimate business purpose; (2) Lib-
erty's majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duties to the mi-
nority shareholders; and (3) the plan would squeeze out the minority
shareholders who would receive less than the stock's fair market value.8 6
The Comptroller rejected NoDak's three arguments and, in August
1990, granted preliminary approval to Liberty's proposed merger plan.8 7
81. Id. at 1418. New Liberty was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dickinson, cre-
ated solely for facilitating the merger. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. As a minority shareholder, NoDak objected to this plan because
NoDak did not want to cash out its equity interest. Id.
84. Id. Section 215a(a) requires approval of a proposed bank merger by the
Comptroller. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) (1988). For the pertinent text of § 215a(a) of
the National Bank Act, see supra note 1.
85. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418.
86. Id. In March 1990, NoDak also commenced a state action in the North
Carolina District Court for Stark County against Liberty National Bank and Trust
Company and its shareholders, which included F.L. Clarkson, Ralph Roshau, Ken-
neth Mann, James Tracy, Robert D. Tracy, Alan Hann and Dickinson Bancorpora-
tion, "alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and entitlement to a substantial
dividend." NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarkson, 471 N.W.2d 140, 141 (N.D. 1991).
The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that the matter was pre-
empted by 12 U.S.C. § 215a of the National Bank Act. Id. However, NoDak con-
tended that its complaint for the declaration of a dividend was an independent
cause of action and not pre-empted by § 215a. Id. at 144. The district court held
that the dividend declaration was not a separate cause of action but was "inextrica-
bly intertwined with the merger issue that is subject to the administrative proce-
dures provided in § 215a for the approval of the proposed organization, merger
and the appraised value of NoDak's shares." Id. at 144-45.
87. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. The Comptroller responded to NoDak's argu-
ments in a memorandum dated July 13, 1990. Id. In the memorandum, the
Comptroller rejected NoDak's argument that the merger lacked a legitimate busi-
ness purpose. Id. The Comptroller also determined that the proposed merger
met all the proper evaluative factors required by the National Bank Act and that
the Board of Director's merger decision had a valid business purpose. Id. For the
text of the evaluative factors that the Comptroller considers in analyzing a merger,
see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
Regarding NoDak's allegation of breach of fiduciary duties, the Comptroller
held that the merger plan met all of the procedural requirements of § 215a(a)-(b).
NoDak, 988 F.2d at 1418. Responding to NoDak's final argument, the Comptroller
934 [Vol. 39: p. 915
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In October 1990, NoDak asked the Comptroller to review his decision in
view of the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Lewis v. Clark.8 8 The
Comptroller rejected NoDak's request and the merger took place in Janu-
ary 1991.89
In June 1991, NoDak filed suit against the Comptroller in district
court alleging the Comptroller's approval of the merger was arbitrary and
not in accordance with the National Bank Act.90 NoDak argued that the
terms of the merger did not permit the minority shareholders the oppor-
tunity to receive shares in New Liberty or Dickinson and, therefore,
abused the minority shareholders' statutory rights.9 1 Accepting the Lewis
rationale, the district court granted summary judgement in favor of
NoDak, holding that the Comptroller lacked authority to approve the
merger because it froze out the minority shareholders by requiring them
to take cash instead of shares in New Liberty.9 2 The Comptroller, Dickin-
son and the surviving New Liberty bank appealed the decision to the
Eighth Circuit.9 3 NoDak was the first time the Eighth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether a merger in which the minority shareholders are re-
quired to accept cash in exchange for their stock is consistent with § 215a
also noted that NoDak's interest was not being frozen out and would be protected
by § 215a(c), which provides an appraisal process to value NoDak's shares. Id.
Under the original merger proposal, NoDak's interest was appraised at $1,644
per share. Id. at 1419 n.3. After the merger agreement was amended, the ap-
praised value was increased to $1,790 per share. Id. Exercising its rights under§ 215a(c), NoDak sought a final and binding appraisal from the Comptroller. Id.
The Comptroller appraised NoDak's interest at $2,215.67 per share, resulting in a
total value of $1,870,025.48. Id. For the pertinent text of 12 U.S.C. § 215a(c), see
supra note 3.
88. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. For a discussion of Lewis, see supra notes 64-72
and accompanying text.
89. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. Specifically, the Comptroller noted that ap-
proval was proper "in light of the substantive and procedural provisions of the
National Bank Act and the Lewis decision did not change that conclusion." Id.
90. Id. NoDak filed the suit in the United States District Court for the District
of North Dakota. Id. at 1416. The district court decision is unpublished.
91. Id.
92. fd. For a further discussion of Lewis, see supra notes 64-72 and accompa-
nying text.
93. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. (citing United States ex rel Glass v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 617 (8th Cir. 1992)). The Eighth Circuit stated that the
standard of review in this case was whether the Comptroller's action was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. at
1419 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)). The NoDak court stated that it owed no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion on the National Bank Act. Id.
(citing First National Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975)). However, the Nodak court further noted
that "[t]he Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of the National Bank Act
is entitled to great deference." Id. (quoting Independent Bankers Ass'n of Ameri-
can v. Clarke, 917 F.2d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 1990) and Arkansas State Bank Com-
missioner v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161, 174 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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of the National. Bank Act.9 4
The Eighth Circuit commenced its analysis by focusing on the statu-
tory language of § 215a of the National Bank Act.95 The appellants, the
Comptroller, Dickinson and the surviving New Liberty Bank, argued that
stock and cash, individually or in combination, are acceptable methods of
compensation in a merger under the National Bank Act and, thus, minor-
ity freeze-out mergers are permissible. 9 6 NoDak contended, however, that
the Act does not specifically allow an acquiring bank to offer stock in ex-
change for a portion of the acquired bank's shares and, at the same time,
give cash to eliminate the remaining shares of the same class of stock.
97
Additionally, NoDak argued that the auction provisions of the Act ren-
dered the minority freeze-out merger "inconsistent with the statutory
scheme." 98 NoDak concluded its argument by noting that "the overriding
purpose" of the merger provisions of the National Bank Act were "to pro-
tect minority shareholders' rights" and that a freeze-out merger, which is
"inherently unfair and contrary to the legislative intent," represented an
abuse of those rights.99
In addressing NoDak's first argument, that freeze-out mergers are in-
consistent with the National Bank Act, CircuitJudge Magill, writing for the
majority of the court, acknowledged that the merger provisions of the Na-
tional Bank Act are susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations
and that the statute does not specifically address freeze-out mergers.
10 0
First, the statute could be interpreted to mean that cash may only be used
94. Id. at 1417. Circuit Judge Magill noted that the NoDak case presented
"one distinct issue of first impression for this court." Id.
95. Id. at 1419-21. For the pertinent statutory provisions of § 215a of the Na-
tional Bank Act, see supra notes 1-3.
96. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419. The appellants further argued that because cash
could be given in exchange for the acquired bank's stock, freeze-out mergers are
clearly acceptable under the National Bank Act. Id. For the pertinent text of 12
U.S.C. § 215a(a) (3), see supra note 1.
97. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419.
98. Id. For the pertinent text of the auction provisions of the National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d), see supra note 3.
99. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419-20.
100. Id. at 1420. For the pertinent text of the merger provisions of the Na-
tional Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a)-(d), see supra notes 1-3. The Eighth Circuit
interpreted the statute under the test established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Na-
tional Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). NoDak, 998 F.2d at
1420. Specifically, the Chevron Court noted that when a court reviews an agency's
construction of a statute that a court administers, a court is confronted with a two-
pronged analysis. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The first question requires the court to
address whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at hand. Id. If
Congress has, then the court and the agency must give effect to the "unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. If, however, the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, "the court does not simply impose
its own construction of the statute as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation," but rather the question for the court is "whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at
843.
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when the minority shareholders vote to exchange stock for cash. 1 1 Sec-
ond, the language could be interpreted to mean that the statute autho-
rizes freeze-out mergers because cash is listed as an acceptable method of
compensation.10 2 The court stated that "the statute does not have to spe-
cifically allow freeze out mergers for them to be acceptable. They only
need to be not inconsistent with the statute taken as a whole."103 The
court further noted that for freeze-out mergers to be inconsistent with the
statute, there must be some indication that Congress did not approve of
the acquiring bank giving the acquired bank's minority shareholders
solely cash for their shares. 10 4 The court determined that the plain lan-
guage of the statute gave no indication that Congress did not approve of
cash-only freeze-out mergers. 10 5 Therefore, the court concluded that the
plain language of the statute, supported the interpretation that freeze-out
mergers are permissible and not inconsistent with the National Bank
Act.' 06
101. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420 (citing ElliotJ. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Merg-
ers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 632-33 (1981)). Weiss, in his
analysis of the first cash merger statutes, noted that an interpretation permitting
cash to be used as consideration only when the minority shareholders voted to
exchange their stock interests for cash is "consistent with the courts' traditional
hostility to take outs." Weiss, supra note 17, at 633.
102. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420 (citing ElliotJ. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Merg-
ers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 632-33 (1981)). Weiss also sug-
gested that because merger statutes usually contemplated the continuation of one
of the merging corporations, "allowing cash to be used as the sole consideration in
a merger must serve the purpose of authorizing take outs of minority sharehold-
ers." Weiss, supra note 17, at 633. Another commentator has supported Weiss'
interpretation and has also asserted that state cash merger statutes reflect a prefer-
ence for "corporate democracy" because no single shareholder could veto a trans-
action. Borden, supra note 31, at 1027. Borden has also argued that allowing one
shareholder's vote to veto a transaction would "be contrary to the policy of corpo-
rate democracy implicit in the [cash merger] statutes." Id.
103. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420.
104. Id.
105. Id. Specifically, the court noted:
[T]he language of § 215a(a) (3) clearly anticipates that cash may be used,
and there is nothing to suggest that it may not be used in combination
with stock. By placing these two forms of compensation in the same sen-
tence each followed by the parenthetical phrase "(if any)," it is certainly
not unreasonable of the Comptroller to interpret the statute to allow that
stock may be exchanged for some acquired shares while cash may be ex-
changed for others. Therefore, the plain language of the statute inclines
us towards appellants' view.
Id. For the pertinent text of 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) (3), see supra note 1.
106. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420. The majority also concluded that the federal
regulations governing national bank mergers, the legislative history of the National
Bank Act's merger provisions and existing case law support the interpretation that
freeze-out mergers are permissible. Id. For the majority's discussion of the federal
regulations governing national bank mergers, see infra notes 115-18 and accompa-
nying text. For the majority's discussion of the legislative history of § 215a of the
National Bank Act, see infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, the Eighth Circuit rejected NoDak's second argument, that
the public auction provisions of the National Bank Act make freeze-out
mergers inconsistent with the statute. 10 7 Specifically, NoDak contended
that § 215a(d) requires the Comptroller to give the dissenting sharehold-
ers the opportunity to bid at an auction on the stock the dissenting share-
holders would have been entitled to receive had they not been offered
cash alone. 108 NoDak concluded that because dissenting shareholders al-
ways retain the right to purchase their shares back at auction, dissenting
shareholders should not be forced to cash out.109 The court determined
that a plain language reading of the auction provisions reveals that
§ 215a(d) only applies when dissenting shareholders are initially offered
stock, but reject it and request a cash payment instead.'1 0 The court rea-
soned that because the statute does not address a situation like the present
one, in which dissenters wish to retain their equity interest but are only
offered cash for their shares, the statute does not forbid it.11
The Eighth Circuit noted that, unlike the mandatory appraisal pro-
cess where the appraisal committee or Comptroller must undertake a valu-
ation of the dissenting shareholders' stock in every possible transaction,
the auction provisions only apply when shares would have been delivered
to the dissenters if they had not requested cash." 2 Because the merger
plan never included an offer of stock to the dissenting shareholders or a
request for cash, the court concluded that the auction provisions were not
applicable to this case.' 13 The Eighth Circuit also stated that "[tihe mi-
nority shareholders are still adequately protected by the mandatory appraisal
provisions for their stock under section 215a(c)." 14
Having analyzed the pertinent statutory language of the National
Bank Act, the Eighth Circuit then addressed Nodak's contention that
freeze-out mergers are inconsistent with the federal regulations under the
Act. 1 5 The court stated that the Comptroller has "not indicated any an-
107. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420. For the pertinent text of the auction provisions
of 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d), see supra note 3.
108. NaDak, 998 F.2d at 1420.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the auction provisions do "not
address a situation where the dissenters have not been offered stock and are of-




114. Id. at 1421 (emphasis added). For the pertinent text of the appraisal
provisions under 12 U.S.C. 215a(c), see supra note 3.
115. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1421-22. The federal regulations under the National
Bank Act, 12 C.F.R. § 5.33 (1992), entitled "Merger, consolidation, purchase and
assumption," provide in pertinent part: "A merger which would not have a sub-
stantially adverse effect on competition and which would be beneficial to the merg-
ing [banks] and to the public normally will be approved." Id. § 5.33(b) (1). The
regulations, as provided in § 5.33(b) (2) (i)-(vi), then list the following six factors
that the Comptroller must consider in evaluating a merger application:
[Vol. 39: p. 915
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tipathy towards freeze out mergers," but instead has implemented rules to
expedite 100% ownership through the use of an interim national bank.
1 16
Therefore, the court decided that by allowing the use of interim banks,
the Comptroller's interpretation of the statute endorses the use of freeze-
out mergers.1 17 The Eighth Circuit decided that it would not depart from
this interpretation because it was consistent with the statute's wording and
with the federal regulations. 118
The Eighth Circuit next considered NoDak's argument that "the Na-
tional Bank Act's legislative history does not support the conclusion that
freeze out mergers are acceptable."'1 19 The Eighth Circuit determined
that although the Act's legislative history does not contain direct state-
ments about freeze-out mergers, it does reveal Congress' intent to facili-
(i) The effect of the transaction upon competition;
(ii) The convenience and needs of the community to be served;
(iii) The financial history of the merging banks;
(iv) The condition of the merging banks, including capital, manage-
ment and earnings prospects;
(v) The existence of insider transactions; and
(vi) The adequacy of disclosure of the terms of the merger.
Id. The court noted that these evaluative factors "do not include consideration of
any vested rights that minority shareholders conceivably have to retain their shares
in the surviving entity." NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1421. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that 12 C.F.R. § 5.33 does not indicate that freeze-out mergers are in-
consistent with § 215a of the National Bank Act. Id.
116. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1421. The Eighth Circuit stated that federal regula-
tion 12 C.F.R. § 5.21, entitled "Organization of an Interim National Bank," is also
applicable to the merger at issue. Id. Section 5.21(a) states that "[a]n Interim
National Bank is a new national bank which is organized solely to facilitate the
creation of a bank holding company or the acquisition of 100% of the voting
shares of a bank." 12 C.F.R. § 5.21(a)(1992). The court further noted that in the
Comptroller's announcement of this rule,
the Comptroller stated that it was extremely difficult for a bank holding
company to obtain 100% ownership of a bank's stock via a straight tender
offer .... Therefore the rule was revised in order to 'eliminate duplica-
tion and delay in charter applications filed solely to facilitate ... the ac-
quisition of 100% of the outstanding voting shares of an existing bank.'
NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1421 (quoting 46 FED. REG. 16,661 (Mar. 13, 1981)). The
Eighth Circuit concluded by stating that through the enactment of 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.21, the Comptroller contemplated a bank holding company acquiring 100%
ownership of a national bank and that the Comptroller enacted these regulations
to streamline the acquisition process. Id.
117. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1421. The Eighth Circuit determined that
"[c) onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construc-
tion of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." Id. (quoting Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
118. Id. at 1422. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit recognized that a court
should not interfere with an agency's interpretation, "unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned." Id. at 1421-22 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
374, 383 (1961)).
119. Id. at 1422.
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tate and simplify national bank mergers and consolidations.1 20
Specifically, by examining the legislative history of the National Bank Act's
merger provisions as enacted in 1918 and amendments to the Act in 1952
and 1959, the court concluded that Congress sought to "simplify and expe-
dite" the bank merger process.12 1 The court determined that by disallow-
ing freeze-outs, one dissenter could "effectively veto" any proposed merger
plan, even if it was beneficial to a majority of shareholders.1 22 The court
concluded that "[s]uch a situation would not encourage bank consolida-
tion, it would stifle it."1 2 3
The court next addressed NoDak's contention that allowing freeze-
out mergers would violate the true purpose of the Act, that is, the protec-
tion of minority shareholder rights. 12 4 The court noted that protection of
minority shareholder interests, while not the only purpose of the Act, is
provided for through the appraisal process and the auction provisions,
when applicable.' 2 5 The court stated that in the absence of any indication
from Congress to the contrary, it must conclude that Congress intended
the appraisal process to provide "adequate protection" for minority share-
holders because it is the only mandatory provision.12 6
Lastly, the Eighth Circuit considered the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Lewis v. Clark.12 7 The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court decid-
ing the NoDak case based its entire opinion on Lewis. 12 8 The court stated
that it disagreed with the Lewis court's holding because the Lewis court
"improperly framed the inquiry."129 Specifically, the court stated that
"[t]he question is not whether there is explicit authority to allow freeze
out mergers; the question is whether freeze out mergers are inconsistent
120. Id. For a further discussion of the legislative intent of the National Bank
Act, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
121. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422. For the pertinent text of the legislative history
of the bank merger provisions as enacted in 1918, and the 1952 and 1959 amend-
ments, see supra notes 56-57.
122. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court further stated that "[iut would be contrary to Congress'
purpose of facilitating and expediting national bank consolidation to allow minor-
ity shareholders to veto a proposed plan which the majority of the stockholders of
the acquiring and the acquired bank have approved." Id. The court explained:
Without any further indication from Congress, we must conclude that
Congress deemed the appraisal process adequate protection for minority
shareholders in a situation such as this because it is the only mandatory
provision. This court will not read into the statute greater rights for the
minority than those protections the legislature specifically provided.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. For a further discussion of the Lewis decision, see supra notes 64-72
and accompanying text.
128. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423. For a discussion of NoDak's district court pro-
ceedings, see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
129. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423.
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with the National Bank Act."13 0
The Eighth Circuit also disagreed with the Lewis court's traditional
view on the protection of minority shareholders, as set forth in Bogert.' 3 '
The court explained that although complete protection of minority share-
holders' interests was the traditional view, the law no longer conforms to
this view and the modern view permits freeze-out mergers of banks, pro-
vided that minority shareholders are given appraisal rights.' 3 2 Rather
than adhere to "an outmoded view of merger law," the Eighth Circuit de-
cided to embrace "the modern view that comports more naturally with the
language of the statute itself, the legislative history, and the regulations
enacted by the administrative agency legitimately entrusted with interpret-
ing the statute."1 3 3
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the Lewis court is the only court to
have directly addressed the specific issue of minority shareholder rights in
a freeze-out merger under § 215a of the National Bank Act.' 3 4 Despite
this fact, the court noted that the Bloomington decision, in which the Sev-
enth Circuit suggested that freeze-out mergers fully comply with the Act,
provided that minority shareholders receive appraisal rights.' 3 5 The
130. Id. The NoDak court emphasized that "[t] here need not be explicit au-
thority as long as all the existing requirements of the National Bank Act are satis-
fied." Id.
131. Id. (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919)).
For a further discussion of Boger, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
The NoDak court also stated that it disagreed with the Lewis court's position
that for the minority shareholders to be treated differently from the majority
shareholders, there must be some specific authority by Congress to permit freeze-
out mergers. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423. The court further noted that in § 215a(c)
of the National Bank Act, Congress provided explicit authority to protect minority
shareholders through ample appraisal rights. Id. Specifically, the NoDak court
stated: "In our view, if Congress wished to prohibit this type of merger it could
have done so and may still do so through amendments. Until it does, however, it is
not inconsistent with the existing law as written and as reasonably interpreted by
the Comptroller." Id.
132. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423. The court observed that the traditional view in
which "minority shareholders have a vested right" in a corporation's participation
was "discredited." Id. at 1424 (quoting Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634 (3d
Cir. 1981)). Likewise, the court stated that "the common-law rule that gave each
shareholder the power to veto a merger" was equally "obsolete." Id. (quoting Cole-
man v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981)). The Eighth Circuit noted that
its comments on the outmoded traditional view address state corporate reorganiza-
tion law and not banking statutes. Id. (emphasis added). However, the court
noted that because banks are frequent participants in freeze-out mergers, the same
issues and reasoning also apply to banks. Id. For a discussion of the traditional
common law view of complete protection of minority shareholders rights and the
development of the modern view that permits freeze-out mergers provided dissent-
ing minority shareholders have appraisal rights, see supra notes 16-54 and accom-
panying text.
133. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1424.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.
Ind. 1988). For a further discussion of Bloomington, see supra notes 59-63 and ac-
companying text.
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Eighth Circuit understood the Bloomington decision to support the conclu-
sion that freeze-out mergers are permissible if minority shareholders are
given appraisal rights.' 3 6 The majority concluded its analysis by stating
that freeze-out mergers are not inconsistent with the National Bank Act
and that the Comptroller has the authority to approve the present merger
transaction.1 3 7 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgement and remanded the case.13 8
Judge Heaney dissented, criticizing the majority for ignoring the
courts' long standing interest in protecting minority shareholder rights
and allowing the bank to disparately treat minority and majority share-
holders.1 39 Accepting the Eleventh Circuit's traditional view of the protec-
tion of minority shareholder rights as set forth in Lewis, Judge Heaney
stated that Congress would have explicitly amended the language of
§ 215a if it had wanted to provide for freeze-out mergers. 140 Judge He-
aney also criticized the majority's conclusion that unequal treatment is
permissible because the value of the majority shareholders' stock is greater
than the value of the minority shareholders' interest.14 1 Lastly, Judge He-
aney agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lewis and concluded
that, " 'without express statutory authority, the Comptroller has no author-
ity to approve a merger [that] requires the holders of stock of equal stand-
136. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1424.
137. Id. at 1425. The Eighth Circuit decided that "[t]he Comptroller has in-
terpreted the Act to allow freeze out mergers, provided adequate appraisal oc-
curs." Id. Further, "[courts should defer to an agency's construction of its own
statutory mandate." Id. (quoting Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First
Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978)). The court also stated that the
Comptroller of Currency is charged with enforcing banking laws to such an extent
that courts should defer to his or her conclusions regarding the meaning of the
banking laws. Id. (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627 (1971)).
138. Id. at 1425.
139. Id. at 1425 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1426 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1425-26 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The majority noted that the Na-
tional Bank Act does demand that the minority shareholders receive a fair ap-
praisal of the value of its interest and that it set out appraisal rules to ensure this
result. Id. at 1423-24. The majority concluded that the appraisal process rules
were followed in this case. Id. While the court's position on the actual value of the
minority interest is unclear, the majority does appear to support the position that
the appraisal remedy "does not give dissenting shareholders any element of value
attributable to the transaction from which they dissent." Id. (quoting FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucTuRE OF CORPORATE LAW
134 (1991)). The majority also appears to support the position that if the federal
law contained such a valuation requirement, the effectiveness of the market for
corporate control and allocating capital would be reduced. Id. at 1424-25 (citing
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982)). In his dissent, Judge Heaney departed from the majority's posi-
tion on freeze-out mergers and the appraisal remedy, arguing that the majority
based "its inequitable treatment of the minority shareholder in this case on an
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IV. ANALvSIS
In NoDak, the Eighth Circuit presumed that the minority shareholders
were adequately protected by the mandatory appraisal provisions of
§ 215a(c). 14 3 In doing so, the court did not consider the possibility that
the appraisal process may not, in itself, adequately protect the interests of
the minority shareholders. The majority concluded that the Comptroller
had the authority to approve the merger and that based on legislative his-
tory and case law, the transaction was not inconsistent with the National
Bank Act.144
At the other extreme, Judge Heaney, in his dissent, insisted on a lit-
eral interpretation of § 215a and refused to give any weight to evolving
case law permitting freeze-out mergers of banks.' 45 Judge Heaney also
failed to consider the legislative history of the merger provisions of the
National Bank Act and the Comptroller's interpretation, and insisted that
§ 215a be interpreted according to congressional intent at the time the
Act was passed.146 Consequently, both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions ignored the need to promote a proper balancing of the opposing
interests, by ensuring that the minority shareholders are adequately pro-
tected through the appraisal process while, at the same time, allowing
freeze-out mergers to take place.
The impact of the Eighth Circuit's decision in NoDak can be assessed
by considering both the benefits of mergers to the corporation as a whole
and to the economy, and the burdens mergers may place on the minority
shareholders. From the corporate viewpoint, freeze-out mergers allow
greater flexibility and expedite the consolidation process. 14 7 By freezing
142. Id. at 1426 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. Clark, 911 F.2d
1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
143. Id. at 1424-25.
144. Id. at 1425. For a further discussion of the majority opinion, see supra
notes 95-138 and accompanying text.
145. NoDak, 988 F.2d at 1425 (Heaney, J., dissenting). For a further discus-
sion ofJudge Heaney's dissenting opinion, see supra notes 139-42 and accompany-
ing text.
146. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1425 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
147. Greene, supra note 32, at 487-88; Norman D. Lattin, The Minority Stock-
holder and Intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 IowA L. REv. 313, 324 (1932); McGarrity, supra
note 32, at 699. Greene suggests that freeze-out mergers provide a necessary and
flexible means of acquisition and transfer. Greene, supra, at 487. Greene also as-
serts that the common law rule of unanimous shareholder consent for mergers was
"abolished to enhance corporate 'flexibility'" by allowing majority shareholders to
effect necessary business changes that provide for business and commercial
growth. Id. at 487 n.3. Greene argues that corporate combinations would be un-
likely if the acquiring corporation did not have the ability to eliminate minority
interests in the acquired corporation. Id. at 488. This commentator also notes
that cash as consideration in mergers and short-form merger statutes "furthered
this trend towards flexibility.' Id. at 488 n.3; see also Manning, supra note 17, at 227
(noting that freeze-out mergers give greater mobility to majority shareholders in
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out minority shareholders, the corporation may avoid potential conflicts
with dissenting shareholders who could otherwise delay or prevent effi-
cient merger transactions.1 48 In this regard, freeze-out mergers not only
minimize potential conflicts in corporate transfers, but also provide the
corporate flexibility necessary for beneficial mergers to take place by elim-
inating the dissenting minority shareholders in a target corporation.
In addition to enhancing flexibility and minimizing potential conflict
in corporate transfers, freeze-out mergers provide several other benefits.
Freeze-out mergers, and mergers in general, provide a corporation with a
less expensive means to enter new product or geographic markets, to
achieve greater economies of scale and to acquire skilled management in
areas of interest.1 4 9 Mergers also often increase management efficiency
approving corporate actions); Note, The Short Merger Statute, supra note 20, at 596
(stating that "the demand for corporate 'flexibility'" has resulted in short-form
merger statutes and other merger statutes that require less than unanimous share-
holder consent).
148. Carney, supra note 16, at 108-09; Greene, supra note 132, at 488; McGar-
rity, supra note 32, at 699. Greene argues that potential conflicts would be too
great if dissenting shareholders could not be eliminated in business combinations.
Greene, supra note 132, at 488. Courts have addressed several types of conflicts
that can arise in a corporation between its controlling majority shareholders and
the minority shareholders. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufin &Jenrette, Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 1393, 1398-1400 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (describing conflicts due to unfair
pricing in parent-subsidiary transaction), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Sin-
clair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-22 (Del. 1971) (describing parent-
subsidiary conflicts due to parent's usurpation of power and requiring subsidiary
to alter dividend policy); Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 204 N.E.2d 643, 644-46
(N.Y. 1965) (describing conflict in distributing tax benefits between parent and
subsidiary).
One commentator has noted that mergers can also eliminate the possibility of
conflicts of interest in a parent-subsidiary relation. Carney, supra note 16, at 107.
For example, when both the parent and subsidiary are operating companies with
joint operations, there may be some problems between the parent and subsidiary
regarding the allocation ofjoint cost that can be subject to attack by the minority
shareholders. See, e.g., Schilick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,,378 (2d
Cir. 1974) (accusing parent of allocating excess interest cost to subsidiary), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Also, where the parent and subsidiary are engaged in
related fields, corporate opportunity allocation problems can also be at conflict.
See, e.g., Schilick, 507 F.2d at 379 (describing conflicts in merger proposal where
subsidiary claimed parent depressed subsidiary's stock value); Sinclair Oil 280 A.2d
at 719-21 (describing conflict between parent and subsidiary, both operating in oil
business, when parent denies subsidiary industrial development opportunities);
Getty Oil Co. v Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 885-86 (Del. 1970) (describing con-
flicts between parent and subsidiary in oil allocations).
Another commentator has noted that "[cl o r p orations seeking normal merg-
ers are reluctant to risk conflict" with dissenting shareholders in a target corpora-
tion. McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699. This commentator has also suggested that
"[f]reeze out mergers make ordinary mergers more practical" by allowing corpora-
tions to eliminate nonconsenting shareholders. Id.
149. See, e.g., Grimes, 392 F. Supp. at 1400 (listing benefits of parent-subsidiary
merger to include reduction in salaries, legal, accounting, public relation expenses
and savings in franchise tax, stock transfer fees); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (Sup.
Ct. 1976). The benefits found in the merger of Libby, McNeil & Libby into a unit
944 [Vol. 39: p. 915
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of Nestle's included: (1) improved management and corporate planning due to
increased availability of resources; (2) increased availability of management experi-
ence; (3) savings due to economies of scale in centralized procurement of raw
materials; (4) marketing economies resulting from joint advertising, distribution
and warehousing; (5) avoidance of duplication in departments and personnel; and
(6) greater diversity of products could be offered which would result in leveling of
cyclical demand. Id.; see also Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 962 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (stating that merger between parent and subsidiary allows for efficiency
through combination of management and resources); Carney, supra note 16, at
106 (stating that mergers increase economies of scale by eliminating duplicative
functions); The Urge to Merge-Where Has It Come from and Where Is It Going?, 35 Bus.
LAw. 1417, 1429 (1980) (listing several advantages of mergers which include op-
portunity to acquire companies and improve their efficiency, opportunity for in-
creased competition, financing for companies otherwise unable to obtain it, and
opportunity to obtain economies of scale); McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699 (stat-
ing merger benefits include: (1) diversification and expansion of products, busi-
ness areas and geographic markets; (2) procurement of skilled management, and
(3) economies of scale); Nancy Garlock & Charles Rudy, Comment, Protection of
Minority Shareholders from Freemeouts Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1421, 1423-24
(1976) (stating advantages of freezing out minority shareholders include operat-
ing economies and increased management efficiencies).
Commentators note that the benefits of a going-private merger vary from
those of a multi-step or parent-subsidiary merger. See, e.g., William J. Harmon,
Note, Corporate Freezeouts: A New Limitation Imposed by the "Entire Fairness" Standard,
1978 U. Ia.. L. REv. 686, 695 (stating that benefits of going-private merger differ
slightly from parent-subsidiary freeze-out merger); McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699
(noting that benefits of going-private merger are not as great as when two entities
combine in multi-step or parent-subsidiary merger). For a discussion of the three
major types of freeze-out mergers, multi-step, parent-subsidiary, and going-private
mergers, see supra note 32.
Going-private mergers do produce some corporate benefits such as increased
business efficiency through the elimination of duplicative functions, the elimina-
tion of SEC compliance costs and stock exchange requirements, and increased
stock value. Harmon, supra, at 695. The resulting increased stock value enhances
stock option plans used to attract good employees and improves a corporation's
ability to finance growth and increase profits. Id.; see also Victor Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private", 61 VA. L. Rv. 1019, 1048 (1975) (noting that increased stock value
results from increased earnings and book value per share due to reduction in
number of shares outstanding); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE LJ. 903, 906 (1975)
[hereinafter Note, Going Private] (stating that justifications for going-private freeze-
out merger may include leveraging effect and positive effect on earnings per share
due to reduced number of shares outstanding).
In addition to the benefits noted above, multi-step and parent-subsidiary
freeze-out mergers, which involve the combination of two entities, may result in
the benefit of synergy because the merger may enhance the value of the combined
entities. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 30, at 1367 (stating that
merger between affiliates may result in benefit of synergy, in contrast to a going-
private freeze-out merger which "simply shifts publicly owned stock onto the hands
of the insiders and produces no economic gains to the enterprise that can be re-
garded as significant"); Mark Mininberg, Achieving Fairness in Corporate Cash Merg-
ers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 16 CONN. L. REv. 95, 99 (1983) (suggesting that
mergers increase the value of each corporation because synergy produced by
merger of two or more corporations will enhance merged corporation's financial
strength and stimulate earnings beyond those possible by two independent corpo-
rations); McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699 (stating that synergy is "the principle that
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and a multi-step or parent-subsidiary
merger produces a synergistic effect because the merger increases the value of
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and reduce or eliminate the conflict inherent in the majority-minority re-
lationship within a corporation. 150 From a broader economic viewpoint,
mergers are instrumental in the efficient allocation of capital in a dynamic
economy, which can lower the cost of capital, enhance corporate profits
and efficiency, and stimulate economic growth and employment.1 5 1
On the other hand, freeze-out mergers also possess the potential for
abuse by majority shareholders and may result in harm to minority share-
holders. 152 The controlling shareholders may employ the freeze-out trans-
each corporation involved"). However, McGarrity notes that the synergies may not
result from every merger, but only when the "merged corporations are comple-
mentary to one another." McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699 n.126. This commenta-
tor also asserts that "[w]hen a corporation acquires an unrelated corporation,
management in the acquiring corporation may be unable to understand the busi-
ness of the acquired corporation and may hinder the performance of the acquired
corporation." Id.
150. Carney, supra note 16, at 106-07; Harmon, supra note 149, at 695; McGar-
rity, supra note 32, at 685. Harmon has suggested that parent-subsidiary freeze-out
mergers create management efficiencies by eliminating duplicative functions.
Harmon, supra note 149, at 695. In addition, commentators have suggested that
freeze-out mergers may promote management efficiency by eliminating conflicts
of interests inherent in the fiduciary standards that are applicable to all parent-
subsidiary transactions. Id.; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 695; Kent T. van den Berg,
Note, Approval of Take-out Mergers by Minority Shareholders: From Substantive to Proce-
dural Fairness,93 YALE L.J. 1113, 1118 (1984). Van den Berg asserts that majority
shareholders face conflicting obligations and tensions. Id. Specifically, the major-
ity shareholders have fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders. Id. However,
when courts do not permit the freezing out of minority shareholder interests, the
majority shareholders may forego a merger that may represent a valuable opportu-
nity for the corporation. Id.
151. Carney, supra note 16, at 106-07, Mininberg, supra note 149, at 99; Mc-
Garrity, supra note 32, at 695. Carney has suggested that a merger between compli-
mentary companies may offset cyclical fluctuations and develop "steadier earnings
and dividend patterns that may ultimately reduce the cost of capital." Carney,
supra note 16, at 106. Carney has also stated that "capital may be allocated to the
most profitable opportunities in the most efficient ways by the combined firm." Id.
(citing Armon A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. Rv. 777 (1972)). Other commentators have sug-
gested that successful mergers can finance growth and increase profits. Brudney,
supra note 149, at 1048, Note, Going Private, supra note 149, at 906; Harmon, supra
note 149, at 695; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 699. Another commentator has sug-
gested that, in general, mergers will increase business efficiency, which will benefit
not only the corporations and shareholders involved, but also consumers and the
economy. Carney, supra note 16, at 109.
152. Harmon, supra note 149, at 695; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 698. Vari-
ous harms and abuses result from the majority shareholders' dominant position on
both sides of the freeze-out merger. Harmon, supra note 149, at 695. Harmon has
suggested that minority shareholder freeze-outs violate the majority shareholders'
fiduciary duties and harm the minority shareholders in three ways. Id. First, Har-
mon stated that through the use of a freeze-out merger, the majority uses its con-
trol to wrongfully terminate the minority shareholders participation in the
corporation. Id. Second, through the elimination of the minority shareholders,
the majority shareholders accrue all of the economic benefits of the merger. Id. at
697. Third, minority shareholders may incur certain costs inherent in a freeze-out
merger, such as the expense and risk associated with finding a replacement invest-
946
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action for their own benefit, rather than the benefit of the corporation.1 53
Additionally, a freeze-out merger transaction may result in the minority
shareholders feeling coerced, as their preferences for participation in the
corporation are not addressed and they are forced to accept cash for their
shares. 154 If the value of the shares has increased over the purchase price,
the minority shareholder also may face a tax liability on an unplanned
capital gain. 155 Most importantly, the minority may not be offered a fair
ment and the legal fees if the minority shareholders seek an appraisal of their
interests. Id. at 698-99. Another commentator, Brudney, has also suggested that
minority shareholders who are forced to sell their stock interest in a freeze-out
merger are not treated equally with majority shareholders who retain their stock
interests because the minority shareholders are confronted with the risk, uncer-
tainty and cost of finding an equivalent investment. Brudney, supra note 149, at
1023.
153. Note, Going Private, supra note 149, at 1034-35; McGarrity, supra note 32,
at 685. In a going-private merger, the potential for benefits accruing to the major-
ity are even greater than in a multi-step or parent-subsidiary merger. McGarrity,
supra note 32, at 700. Controlling shareholders have insider information about the
corporation that enable them to execute a merger at a time that is most beneficial
to the majority. Id. Controlling shareholders can also abuse a merger transaction
by electing to go private at a turning point in the corporation's growth, but before
the investing public perceives the growth potential. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 30, at 1368. Consequently, the majority shareholders cannot participate in a
merged corporation's potential growth and the minority shareholders will be the
exclusive beneficiaries. McGarrity, supra note 32, at 700; see also Note, Going Pri-
vate, supra note 149, at 922-23 (suggesting that true motive for going-private merg-
ers may be personal gain for controlling shareholders while benefit to corporation
is unclear).
154. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 30, at 1357 (stating that
"freezeouts, by definition, are coercive: minority shareholders are bound by ma-
jority rule to accept cash or debt in exchange for their common shares even
though the price they receive may be less than the value they assign to those
shares"); Harmon, supra note 149, at 689 (noting that appraisal remedy may not
consider minority shareholders' preference for participation in merged
corporation).
155. Greene, supra note 132, at 490 & n.12; Lynch, supra note 17, at 55; Har-
mon, supra note 149, at 698. Lynch has stated that tax considerations are one of
the greatest influences in investment decisions. Lynch, supra note 17, at 55. This
commentator has asserted that all the adverse tax consequences are borne by "the
selling minority shareholder, even though the transaction was undertaken entirely
for the benefit of the majority." Id. Lynch has explained that I.R.C. § 1033(a)
protects taxpayers from recognizing capital gains in other instances of involuntary
conversions such as destruction, condemnation, theft or seizure, but provides the
minority shareholders no protection from the adverse tax consequences resulting
from a freeze-out merger. Id. Harmon has explained that the income tax conse-
quences vary with the structure of the freeze-out merger. Harmon, supra note 149,
at 698 n.85. However, because majority shareholders are in control of the transac-
tion, the freeze-out merger is often structured to be tax-free to the majority share-
holders and unlikely to be tax-free to the minority shareholders. Id. A freeze-out
merger can only be tax-free if the transaction qualifies as a "reorganization" under
the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 368(a) (1993). The various tax consequences
of freeze-out mergers are not within the scope of this Note. For an in-depth discus-
sion of the tax consequences of various types of mergers, see Boris B. BIrIKR &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§§ 14.02-14.58 (5th ed. 1987); Tortoriello, supra note 1, at 89-98.
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price for their shares or the controlling shareholders may attempt to ma-
nipulate the price of the firm's shares to reduce payment to the minority
shareholders. 156 Because the appraisal remedy under § 215a of the Na-
tional Bank Act precludes the minority from retaining an equity interest in
the merged corporation, it is imperative that the appraisal process accu-
rately reflect the fair value of the minority interest.1 5 7
By allowing freeze-out mergers, courts accept the fact that some de-
156. Lynch, supra note 17, at 53-56; Harmon, supra note 149, at 691. Harmon
has explained that many freeze-outs may reduce or eliminate the number of shares
held by outsiders. Harmon, supra note 149, at 691 & n.39. The reduction in stock
trading may reduce shareholder liquidity. Id. This effectively results in price ma-
nipulation because the "[1] ack of liquidity may lower the market price of the stock
or even make it unmarketable at any price for certain periods of time," thereby
affecting the price minority shareholders will receive for their stock interest. Id.
157. See 12 U.S.C. § 215a(c) (1988). Originally, courts and appraisers used
one of three valuation methods: net asset value, net earnings value and market
value. Schinner, supra note 21, at 267. The majority of courts now accept a com-
promise appraisal process where the stock's value is based on each of the three
methods. See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148
(Mass. 1979) (utilizing a weighting method appraisal process); Blasingame v.
American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 668 & n.1 (Tenn. 1983) (same). The
court or appraiser first obtains a value for each of the three methods and assigns a
weight to those values according to its relative importance to the facts of a particu-
lar case. Schinner, supra note 21, at 267. This weighting method is known as the
"Delaware Block Approach" and is "based on the premise that no one factor is
determinative of value and that each value should carry some, but not conclusive
weight." Id.
Under § 215a of the National Bank Act, an appraisal process is used that is
similar to the Delaware Block Approach. See 53 FED. REG. 32,967 (Aug. 22, 1988).
On August 22, 1988, the Comptroller issued Banking Bulletin 88-14 (the "Ap-
praisal Bulletin"), which describes the methods used to estimate the value of a
bank's shares when the acquired bank's minority shareholders dissent from the
merger. 53 FED. REc. 32,967 (Aug. 22, 1988). According to the Appraisal Bulletin,
the Comptroller determines share value based on one or more of the following
methods: (1) market value (if there are recent prices for a sufficient number of
recent transactions among non-insiders under normal trading circumstances); (2)
capitalized earnings or "investment value" (i.e., estimated annual earnings times a
price/earnings ratio typical for comparable institutions); and (3) adjusted book
value (i.e., book value per share times the average market price to book value ratio
of comparable institutions). Id. at 32,967-68. If more than one method is used,
the Comptroller applies varying weights to reach an overall valuation. Id. The
Comptroller assigns a weight to each one of the valuation methods used "based on
how accurately the given method is believed to represent market value." Id. at
32,968.
Although courts have used the Delaware Block Approach for over four de-
cades, this approach came under attack in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983). In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the inadequa-
cies of the Delaware Block Approach and restructured the valuation method. Id.
at 703-04, 712-13. The Weinberger court disallowed the Delaware Block Approach
to the extent that it did not permit the use of other valuation techniques generally
accepted in the business community. Id. at 712-13. The Weinbergercourt described
the Delaware Block Approach as "clearly outmoded" and did not reflect the intent
or purpose of the Delaware appraisal statute, which includes an evaluation of "all
relevant factors." Id. Specifically, under title 8, § 262(h) of the Delaware Code,
the Court of Chancery
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gree of harm does occur to the minority shareholders.'15 8 However, courts
have approved these transactions because of the substantial benefits accru-
ing to the corporation as a whole and to the economy.15 9 Although courts
are justified in supporting freeze-out mergers, greater protection for mi-
nority shareholders seems warranted. 160 This greater protection, how-
shall appraise the shares, determining fair value exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid
upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such
fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1993) (emphasis added).
Courts have responded to the Weinberger decision in various ways. Some courts
have refused to modify the use of the Delaware Block Approach. See, e.g., Rosen-
blatt v. Getty Oil, Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (stating that "Weinberger did
not abolish the block formula, only its exclusivity as a tool of valuation"); Leader v.
Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173, 178 (Mass. 1985) (stating that Delaware Block Ap-
proach for valuing closely held stock is not outmoded); Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at
668 & n.1 (holding that Weinberger does not alter use of Delaware Block Ap-
proach). Some courts have adopted a more liberal appraisal process and allow the
use of several factors to determine the appraised value. See, e.g., Dermody v. Sticco,
465 A.2d 948, 950 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that all relevant factors to be
considered in arriving at fair value); Alpert v. 28 St. Williams Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19,
27 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that factors used in appraisal proceeding would include,
but not be limited to net asset value, book value, earnings, market value and invest-
ment value); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 783-84 (Ohio 1987)
(holding that factors to consider in appraisal process include "[n]et asset value;
going concern value; liquidation value; net equity value; earnings value of the
stock or dividends prospects; the nature of the enterprise and its relative position
within the particular industry; post-merger gains or synergistic gain; tax benefits to
all concerned; and recession and equitable concerns").
158. See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F. 625, 631
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (noting that freeze-outs violate shareholders' vested right to
continued participation in the profits of the corporation); Kellogg v. Georgia-Pac.
Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719, 724 (W.D. Ark. 1964) (noting that the price minor-
ity shareholders receive for their shares may not be fair if determined by control-
ling majority shareholders); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148,
151-52 (N.Y. 1919) (noting that freeze-out of minority shareholders at an improper
low price violates the fiduciary duty of majority to minority). For a further discus-
sion of the specific harms to minority shareholders, see supra notes 152-57 and
accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del. 1971)
(noting that parent-subsidiary freeze-outs promote business efficiency by eliminat-
ing conflicts of interests inherent in fair dealing standards that parent must meet
in all transactions with its subsidiary); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883,
886-88 (Del. 1970) (same); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Inc., Profit Sharing Plan v.
Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting that
merged corporation benefits from potential tax savings, enhanced market value
and increased intrinsic value derived from elimination of minority shareholders).
Freeze-out mergers are often justified because the benefits to the corporation out-
weigh the burdens placed on the minority shareholders. Brudney, supra note 149,
at 1027-28; Lattin, supra note 147, at 323-24; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 698. For
a further discussion of the benefits of freeze-out mergers, see supra notes 147-51
and accompanying text.
160. McGarrity, supra note 32, at 700. This protection is especially needed in
a going-private merger where the minority shareholders cannot reinvest in the
1994] NOTE 949
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ever, should not be in the form of a subjective balancing test requiring the
controlling shareholders in a corporation to prove that the potential bene-
fits from the merger outweigh the harm borne by the minority sharehold-
ers who have been eliminated from the corporation. Likewise, it would
not be productive to subject the proposed merger to some type of "busi-
ness purpose test," requiring the controlling shareholders to prove that
the merger transaction possesses a valid business purpose for it to take
place. Such tests would discourage mergers through increased costs and
greater uncertainty, and would likely reduce the substantial benefits that
arise from merger activity. 16 1
Rather than applying a balancing or business purpose test, satisfactory
protection for minority shareholders could be achieved by ensuring that
the "entire fairness test," as established in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,162 is ap-
plied to freeze out mergers in the banking industry.163 The "entire fair-
ness test" is comprised of two basic components, fair dealing and fair
price. 1 4 Fair dealing relates to all relevant and pertinent information con-
cerning the merger transaction, such as how it was initiated, negotiated,
structured and disclosed, and how the approval of the directors and share-
holders was obtained. 16 5 Fair price concerns the financial and economic
implications of the proposed merger and addresses those factors that de-
termine the inherent value of the firm's common equity, such as asset
values, earnings and future prospects for the firm. 166 Because minority
shareholders are precluded from participation in the merged firm, the
issue of price is paramount. 167
To better ensure that the minority's shares are valued fairly in a
freeze-out merger, Congress should amend the National Bank Act and
newly-merged corporation. Id. For a discussion of other problems associated with
going private mergers, see supra note 149.
161. For a discussion of the business purpose test as presented in Singer, see
supra note 54. In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled the Singer
business purpose test and noted that the test had already been "virtually inter-
preted out of existence" and would no longer be considered part of Delaware law.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. For a discussion of the evolution of cases from Singer to
Weinberger, see supra note 54.
In NoDak, the Comptroller concluded that the proposed merger had a valid
business purpose because all of the proper evaluative factors required under the
National Bank Act had been met. NoDak Bancororation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d
1416, 1418 (8th Cir. 1993). For the text of 12 C.F.R. §5.33(b), listing the six evalu-
ative factors to be considered in determining the validity of a bank merger under
the National Bank Act, see supra note 115.
162. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
163. Id. at 711. For a further discussion of the Weinberger "entire fairness test,"
see infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
164. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The Weinberger court also recognized that "in a nonfraudulent trans-
action ... price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other fea-
tures of the merger." Id. at 710.
[Vol. 39: p. 915
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adopt an appraisal policy similar to that employed in New York state. 168
Under the New York appraisal valuation statute, dissenting minority share-
holders receive a value for their shares, based on contemporary valuation
techniques, equal to what the shares would be worth if the firm were
merged in an arm's length transaction. 16 9 If this standard is adopted in
bank freeze-out mergers, minority shareholders will receive a value for
their shares that reflects the price premium normally associated with a
merger.170 A price that includes the merger premium will not only more
168. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1986). For the perti-
nent text of § 623(h) (4), see infra note 169. The appraisal remedy advocated in
this Note expands upon the "entire fairness test" in Weinberger and ensures that
minority shareholders receive a price for their shares that reflects the merger pre-
mium. Some commentators have suggested that the Weinberger decision was influ-
enced by the New York appraisal statute allowing "all relevant factors" to be
employed in the appraisal process. Arthur Borden, Delaware Court Rights a Fresh
Script for New Going Private Performances, N.Y.LJ., June 6, 1983, at 29, col. 1; Diane
M. Morello, Note, Reappraising Minority Shareholder Protection in Freezeout Mergers:
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 144, 160 (1983).
169. Weiss, supra note 17, at 684; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 696; Morello,
supra note 168, at 161. The statute gives courts the right to consider the nature of
the transaction and the corporation's motive for the transaction when valuing the
minority shareholder interests. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw. § 623(h)(4). Section
623(h) (4) of New York's Business Corporation Law provides in pertinent part:
In fixing the fair value of the shares, the court shall consider the nature
of the transaction giving rise to the shareholder's right to receive pay-
ment for shares and its effects on the corporation and its shareholders,
the concepts and methods then customary in the relevant securities and
financial markets for determining the fair value of shares of a corporation
engaging in a similar transaction under comparable circumstances and
all other relevant factors.
Id.
170. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 684 (stating that New York statute "elimi-
natefs] the controlling shareholders' ability to effect [freeze-outs] solely to earn
arbitrage profit available because of differences" between price willing purchaser
would be prepared to pay for company in transaction negotiated at arm's length
and price "conceptually unsound valuation formulas suggest represent 'fair
value' "); McGarrity, supra note 32, at 696-97 (stating that New York appraisal stat-
ute "protects minority shareholders from majority shareholders who may attempt
to take advantage of an undervalued market price"). In addition, commentators
have noted that the legislative drafters of the New York statute intended for dis-
senting minority shareholders to receive a portion of the merger premium. Weiss,
supra note 30, at 251-52; McGarrity, supra note 32, at 696 & n.111. The drafters'
comments to the New York statute state:
[C]ourts should determine fair value by reference to the nature and ef-
fects of the transaction giving rise to the shareholder's right to dissent
.... The case law interpretation of fair value has not always reflected the
reality of corporate business combinations. These transactions involve
the sale of the corporation as a whole, and the corporation's value as an
entirety may be substantially in excess of the actual or hypothetical mar-
ket price for shares trading among investors. The experience has demon-
strated that large premiums over market price are commonplace in
mergers and in acquisitions.
Legislative Findings for 1982 Amendments to Business Corporation Law, 1982 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 202, § 1, reprinted in N.Y. Bus. Coat. AcT § 623 (McKinney 1986).
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fully reflect fair market value, but minority shares will no longer be treated
differently than controlling shares, from a valuation perspective. 171 Addi-
tionally, the controlling shareholders' ability to "cheat" minority share-
holders by manipulating the price of the firm's common stock will be
lessened considerably if Congress adopts the New York appraisal
171. Under the appraisal process the Comptroller uses to value dissenting
shareholders' stock in a merger under the National Bank Act, the Comptroller
does not include merger premiums for control in the valuation of shares on the
ground that the purchase premiums depend "entirely on the acquisition or con-
trol plan of the purchasers, and such payments are not regular or predictable ele-
ments of market value." 53 FED. REG. 32,967, 32,968 (Aug. 22, 1988).
Commentators disagree as to whether the merger premium should be in-
cluded in the price received by dissenting minority shareholders in freeze-out
mergers. Thompson argues that when majority shareholders force minority share-
holders to give up their shares without the option of continued participation in the
merged firm, the valuation of a minority shareholder's interest should reflect the
firm's "future prospects." Thompson, supra note 21, at 427. Thompson also ar-
gues that the appraisal process must "account for the value of the shareholder's
right (if any) in continued participation, which the majority has taken from the
[minority] shareholder voluntarily." Id. Furthermore, Thompson contends that
while freeze-out mergers may enhance the welfare of the shareholders as a group
and contribute to efficiency in the market for corporate control, valuation of the
minority interest based on a pre-merger standard could result in majority share-
holders forcing minority shareholders to accept an inadequate price. Id. at 427-28.
Another commentator has argued that fiduciary principles require that mi-
nority stockholders share in any premium that occurs as a result of the synergistic
benefits of a merger. Morello, supra note 168, at 158-89. Morello has suggested
that an appraisal of minority shares based on an arm's length transaction standard
would ensure that the minority shareholders receive adequate consideration for
their shares. Id. at 162. Additionally, Brudney and Chirelstein have contended
that because a freeze-out merger often result in a new corporation with a greater
value than either firm could have realized as separate entities, a pro-rata share of
this increased value should accrue to minority shareholders. Victor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 297, 322 (1974).
Mininberg has argued that minority stockholders should receive the post-
merger value of their shares. Mininberg, supra note 149, at 116-17. Because the
minority shareholders do not control the timing of the merger, Mininberg has
suggested that the appraisers or courts should consider, in valuing the minority
shareholders interests, "when the rational shareholder, having knowledge of the
merger, would have decided to sell." Id. at 117. Mininberg has contended that in
establishing value, a single valuation formula, such as the Delaware Block Ap-
proach, is inadequate because it cannot possibly accommodate all factors relevant
to the determination of share value at a given point in time. Id.
However, Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that the fiduciary principle
does not require that merger gains be shared equally between shareholders. Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698,
731 (1982). According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the fiduciary principle is satis-
fied if some investors receive a premium for their shares while the remaining inves-
tors do not suffer a loss. Id. Easterbrook and Fischel have also contended that an
unequal division of gains from merger and other corporate control transactions
facilitates wealth maximization by providing an incentive for a group, in this case
the majority shareholders, to undertake risk. Id.
38




Freeze-out mergers can provide substantial benefits not only to the
corporation but, in a broader sense, to the economy.1 73 Although minor-
ity shareholders may be precluded from future participation in the
merged firm and may be forced to accept cash for their shares, the bene-
fits resulting from merger transactions appear to outweigh these harms,
provided that the minority shareholders receive a fair value for their
shares.174 In NoDak, the Eighth Circuit recognized the benefits that often
result from merger activity and appeared to have considered them in arriv-
ing at its decision. 175 Under the National Bank Act, the Comptroller can
employ one or more of several valuation methods in the appraisal of the
minority shareholders' interests, some of which are not market-based. 176
Most importantly, the Comptroller does not have to consider any pre-
mium that arises from the merger in the valuation of the minority share-
holders' interest. 177
To ensure the fair valuation of the minority's shares, full disclosure of
all relevant information associated with the merger and a market-based
appraisal process, which includes a merger premium, are required. 17
8
The freeze-out merger should not be a means by which wealth can be
transferred from the minority to the majority shareholders, but rather, a
means by which financial and physical capital can be effectively allocated
and consolidation and efficiency gains can be achieved.
Diana R. Ivanovic
172. For a discussion of the potential for price manipulation in freeze-out
mergers, see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the benefits of freeze-out mergers, see supra notes
147-51 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the need for a fair valuation of minority shareholders'
interests which takes into account the merger premium, see supra notes 168-72
and accompanying text.
175. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422-23. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in NoDak, see supra notes 73-142 and accompanying text.
176. See 53 FED. REG. 32,967 (Aug. 22, 1988). For a discussion of the appraisal
process employed by the Comptroller in valuing minority shareholders' interests,
see supra note 157.
177. For a discussion of the need to include a merger premium in the valua-
tion of dissenting minority shareholders' interests under the National Bank Act,
see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of a market-based valuation process as presented in the
Weinberger "entire fairness test" and the New York appraisal statute which includes
a merger premium, see supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
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